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Various macroeconomic effects resulted from the changing economic and
societal structure in the second half of the 20th century, which greatly impacted
women’s economic position in the United States. Using dynamic programming as the
main modeling tool, and U.S. data for factual evidence, three papers are developed
to test the validity of three related hypotheses focusing on female employment,
education, marriage, and divorce trends.
The first chapter estimates how much of the post-World War II evolution
in employment and average wages by gender can be explained by a model where
changing labor demand requirements are the driving force. I argue that a large
fraction of the original female employment and wage gaps in mid-century, and the
subsequent shrinking of both gaps, can be explained by labor reallocation from
brawn-intensive to brain-intensive jobs favoring women’s comparative advantage in
brain over brawn. Thus, aggregate gender-specific employment and wage gap trends
resulting from this labor reallocation are simulated in a general equilibrium model.
vi
The material in the second chapter is based on an ongoing joint project with
Fatih Guvenen. We argue for a strong link between the rise in the proportion of
educated women and the evolution of the divorce rate since mid-century. As women
become increasingly educated their bargaining power within marriage rises and their
economic situation in singlehood improves making marriage less attractive and di-
vorce more attractive. Similarly, a change in the divorce regime (e.g., U.S. unilateral
divorce laws in the 1970s), making marriages less stable, incentivizes women to seek
education as insurance against the higher divorce risk. A framework that models the
interdependence between education, marriage and divorce is developed, simulated,
and contrasted against United States data evidence.
The third chapter considers the implications of marital uncertainty on ag-
gregate household savings behavior. To this end, an infinite horizon model with
perpetual youth that features uncertainty over marriage quality is developed. Simi-
larly to Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull (1997), I test how much of the savings rate decline
from the 1960s to the 1980s can be explained by the changing United States demo-
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Chapter 1
Brain versus Brawn: The Realization of Women’s
Comparative Advantage
This chapter estimates how much of the post-World War II evolution in em-
ployment and average wages by gender can be explained in a model where changing
labor demand requirements are the driving force. I argue that a large fraction of
the original female employment and wage gaps in mid-century, and the subsequent
shrinking of both gaps, can be explained by labor reallocation from brawn-intensive
to brain-intensive jobs favoring women’s comparative advantage in brain over brawn.
1.1 Introduction
One of the greatest phenomena of the 20th century has been the rise in
female labor force participation. Using evidence from United States data, this study
develops a general equilibrium model based on the following two facts of labor supply
and wages since World War II:
1. Women’s labor force participation, aged 25 to 64, rose from 32 percent in 1950
to 71 percent in 2005 (see Figure 1.1), while men’s labor force participation
stayed fairly steady.1
1All statistics reported in this chapter, unless noted otherwise are derived from the 1950 United
States Census Integrated Public Use Micro-data Samples (IPUMS-USA, Ruggles et al., 2004) and
1
2. The gender wage gap, defined as average female to average male wages, changed
quickly during the same period. After initially falling from about 64 percent to
a low of 59 percent, the gender wage gap began rising again in the mid-1970s
reaching around 77 percent by 2005 (see Figure 1.1).
While it is a popular perception that anti-discrimination laws focused on
gender equality were the main reasons behind women’s changing labor market par-
ticipation and earnings, economic studies have found various other reasons played
an important role in shaping women’s labor market experience, such as changes
in women’s work experience, education, and occupational mix (see, for example,
Black and Juhn, 2000; Blau, 1998; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2005). The forces be-
hind the changing female employment and wages should be of particular interest to
economists and policy makers alike.
This chapter presents evidence from the United States and develops a gen-
eral equilibrium model where women’s improved labor market experience is driven
by labor demand changes. I argue that the main factor in improving women’s la-
bor market opportunities, and their potential wages, is the shift in labor shares
away from brawn-intensive occupations, as suggested by Galor and Weil (1996).
The shift in labor shares is modeled by a linear exogenous “skill-biased” technical
change, where skilled occupations are those requiring relatively more brain than
brawn. This definition deviates from the traditional education-based skill classifi-
cation. For example, while a department store sales worker is usually classified as
2000 Current Population Survey Integrated Public Use Micro-data Samples (IPUMS-CPS, King
et al., 2004).
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unskilled, in this study he/she is part of the “skilled” labor force since a sales worker
requires almost no physical strength in preforming his/her job effectively. More
specifically, the model economy consists of two types of occupations, brain-intensive
and brawn-intensive. These occupations are aggregated by a CES production func-
tion to produce a final market good. Heterogeneous agents differ in their innate
intellectual aptitude (brain), physical ability (brawn) and, therefore, in their will-
ingness to work in either occupation or in the labor market at all. Agents maximize
consumption over market and home produced goods by allocating time between the
labor market and their home. In addition, finitely lived myopic agents can increase
their innate brain abilities by choosing to become educated when young.
3



































































































Male Brain to Brawn Labor Supply
Female Brain to Brawn Labor Supply
A selection bias of women into brain-intensive occupations with initially
lower wages (discussed in detail later), a rise in the relative returns to these occupa-
tions, and a rise in women’s relative labor supply to these occupations since World
War II is undisputable (see Figure 1.2). Therefore, I argue that female labor force
participation rose following skill-biased technical change favoring women’s compar-
ative advantage in brain. Following this hypothesis, the wage gap closed for two
reasons, (1) a rise in the returns to “female-friendly” occupations and (2) a faster
increase in the female to male efficiency-unit labor supply to these occupations.
Consequently, the goal of this chapter is to estimate the quantitative importance of
labor demand changes in explaining the shrinking wage gap and the rise in female
labor force participation.
4
The rise of female labor force participation has been the focus of many recent
macroeconomic papers. Some of these studies argue that improvements in home
technology, such as the invention and marketization of household appliances (see,
for example, Greenwood et al., 2002, and references therein), or the improvements in
baby formulas (see Albanesi and Olivetti, 2006), enabled women to enter the labor
market. While improvements in home technology freed women from time-consuming
household chores, theories only focused on home technology improvements do not
and cannot effectively address the evolution of the wage gap over time.
Another set of research argues that certain observed labor market changes,
such as the closing wage gap (see Jones et al., 2003) or the increased returns to
experience for women (see Olivetti, 2006), are largely responsible for the rise in
female employment. Neither of these studies explain why women suddenly earned
higher wages or had higher returns to experience, thus leaving the mechanism behind
the closing wage gap unexplained.
To summarize, while previous studies have been successful in explaining part
of Fact 1, the rise of the female labor force, they say nothing about the closing gender
wage gap beyond taking Fact 2 as given. That is, they only address one aspect of
the events shaping women’s labor market experience.
Two recent studies focus on the effects of cultural, social, and intergenera-
tional learning on labor supply (see Fernández, 2007; Fogli and Veldkamp, 2007). As
before, these models are successful in explaining part of the rise in female labor force
participation. In addition, Fogli and Veldkamp (2007) extend their theory to explain
the evolution of wages through women’s self-selection bias, i.e., the characteristics
5
of working women changed in the 20th century. However, this model is unable to
match the complete wage evolution, only matching either the initial stagnation or
the later rise.
All previously mentioned studies focus on labor supply side changes while
keeping the labor demand constant. Naturally, this leaves one big unexplored fact:
the changing labor demand. Two econometric studies analyze the effects of labor
inputs in production on the gender wage gap. Wong (2006) finds that skill-biased
technical change had a similar impact on men’and women’s wages and, therefore,
cannot explain the closing wage gap. Black and Spitz-Oener (2007) quantify the
contribution of changes in specific job tasks on the closing wage gap from 1979
to 1999 for West Germany. The authors find that skill-biased technical change in
West Germany, especially through the adoption of computers, can explain about
41 percent of the closing wage gap. While these two studies estimate the effects
of relative labor demand changes on the wage gap, both assume an inelastic labor
supply. Consequently, they cannot address the non-linear path of average female to
male wages stemming from women’s self-selection bias into the labor market.
Undoubtedly trends in demand changes are missing from macroeconomic
theory focusing on the rise of the female labor force and the shrinking wage gap. I
argue that these trends arise from one underlying economic process: technical change
leading to labor reallocation from brawn-intensive to brain-intensive occupations.
The mechanism developed in this chapter is able to explain: (1) about 79 percent
of the rise in female labor force participation, (2) approximately 37 percent of the
stagnation in average female to male wages from 1960 to 1980 and (3) about 83
6
percent of the closing wage gap between 1980 and 2005.
While the empirical results are specific to the United States, the model
developed could also be used to study cross-country differences in women’s labor
market participation. Rogerson (2005) notes that the change in relative employ-
ment of women and the aggregate service share (a brain-intensive sector given data
evidence) between 1985 and 2000 are highly correlated at 0.82, concluding that coun-
tries which added the most jobs to the service sector also closed the employment
gap the most.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides
further evidence on the changing labor market, focusing on (1) the evolution of phys-
ical and intellectual job requirements in the United States over time, (2) women’s
self-selection into low-strength jobs due to physical hurdles, and (3) the effects of
the changing labor demand for physical and intellectual abilities on female and
male wage differentials. The general equilibrium model is outlined in Section 1.3,
and Section 1.4 provides analytical results of skill-biased technical change on labor
demand, labor supply, and wages. Section 1.5 discusses the estimation and calibra-
tion procedure, and Section 1.6 presents labor market trends resulting from a linear
exogenous skill-biased technical change starting in the 1960s. Lastly, Section 1.7
discusses extending the model to married households, and Section 1.8 concludes.
This study’s main contribution is in presenting a theory that simultaneously
explains Fact 1, the rise in female employment, and Fact 2, the evolution of the
gender wage gap, through a rise in “female-friendly” occupations driven by skill-
biased technical change.
7
1.2 United States Labor Facts
To explore the relationship between the rise in female labor force participa-
tion and changes in labor demand, this study focuses on the relative demand and
supply of two types of labor inputs: intellect and physical strength. This study
starts from the premise that women have, on average, less brawn than men. One
well documented sector where women are barred from certain occupations because
of physical strength requirements is the military. For example, a “Women Soldiers
‘Face Frontline Ban’” (h 30) article notes that starting in 2002 the British mili-
tary barred women from front-line combat since they failed to pass the required
physical test, where, “soldiers under 30 had to carry 20 kg of equipment and their
rifle while running a mile and a half in 15 minutes, as well as carrying a colleague
for 50 yards.” Accepting that women and men have similar levels of brain, men
have a comparative advantage in brawn-intensive occupations. However, technolog-
ical change shifts labor demand toward low-brawn occupations diminishing men’s
comparative advantage in the labor market.
Using factor analysis, I obtain brain and brawn estimates by United States
census occupation and industry classifications from the 1977 Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Title (DOT). The 1977 DOT reports 38 job characteristics for over 12,000
occupations, documenting (1) general educational development, (2) specific voca-
tional training, (3) aptitudes required of a worker, (4) temperaments or adaptability
requirements, (5) physical strength requirements, and (6) environmental conditions.
For example, general educational development measures the formal and informal
educational attainment required to preform a job effectively by rating reasoning,
8
language and mathematical development. Each reported level is primarily based on
curricula taught in the United States, where the highest mathematical level is ad-
vanced calculus, and the lowest level only requires basic operations, such as adding
and subtracting two-digit numbers. Specific vocational preparation is measured in
the number of years a typical employee requires to learn the job tasks essential to
perform at an average level. Eleven aptitudes required of a worker (e.g., general
intelligence, motor coordination, numerical ability) are rated on a five point scale,
with the first level being the top ten percent of the population and the fifth level
compromising the bottom ten percent of the population. Ten temperaments re-
quired of a worker are reported in the 1977 DOT, where the temperament type is
reported without any numerical rating. An example of a temperament is the ability
to influence people in their opinions or judgments. Physical requirements include a
measure of strength required on the job, rated on a five point scale from sedentary
to very heavy, and the presence or absence of tasks such as climbing, reaching, or
kneeling. Lastly, environmental conditions measure occupational exposure (presence
or absence) to environmental conditions, such as extreme heat, cold, and noise. I use
factor analysis similarly to Ingram and Neumann (2006) to reduce the dimensional-
ity of DOT job characteristics. Using factor analysis, a linear relationship between
normally distributed broad skill categories (e.g., brain, brawn, motor coordination)
and the 38 DOT characteristics is estimated from the associated 38 variable corre-
lation matrix. For a detailed explanation of the estimation procedure see Appendix
A.
9
1.2.1 Brain and Brawn in the United States
Using maximum likelihood estimation methods, three factors are determined
sufficient in capturing the information contained in the 38 DOT characteristics.
Given the estimated coefficients (factor loadings) I term these factors: brain, brawn,
and motor coordination (see Appendix A Table A.1). These factors are merged
with the 1950 and 1960 United States Census data and the 1968 to 2005 Current
Population Survey (CPS) data to compute trends over time.2 Figure 1.3, which plots
all 1977 occupational brain and brawn combinations, clearly depicts the difference in
brain and brawn requirements across the economy. Figure 1.3 also shows aggregate
labor shares from the 1971 CPS civilian population. To compute aggregate factor
demand changes in the United States over time, 1977 occupation-industry factor
estimates are aggregated using United States Census and CPS civilian labor force
weights. Figure 1.4 depicts aggregate factor standard deviations from the mean
over time, with a normalized mean of zero in 1950. While motor coordination
remains fairly constant over time, the brain supply steadily increases and the brawn
supply steadily decreases. This rising trend in the supply of brain versus the falling
trend in the supply of brawn is what I term skill-biased technical change. These
trends are not specific to the 1977 DOT, since Ingram and Neumann (2006) obtain
similar trends over time using the 1991 DOT (see Figure 3 in the referenced paper).
Note that using a single DOT survey to determine job requirements implies that
the specific job factor requirements did not change over the last five decades. For
2The IPUMS Census and CPS projects provide a consistent 1950 United States Census classifi-
cation of occupations and industries over the years, which is used in merging 1977 DOT brain and
brawn factors.
10




























example, a craftsman utilized the same brawn level in 1950 as in 2005. Ergo, all
trends pictured are due to changes in the composition (mix) of occupations within
the economy, and the rise in brain and fall in brawn requirements might possibly be
greater than shown due to intra occupation skill-biased technical changes. Figure 1.5
depicts brain and brawn standard deviations by gender over time, with the selection
of women into low-brawn occupations clearly evident. Given women’s lower innate
brawn levels, this bias toward low brawn occupations can be either due to employee
self-selection or employer discrimination. Additionally, the total brain supply has
risen continuously since the 1950s, with women’s brain supply surpassing men’s by
the 1980s. This trend could possibly be linked with increased educational investment
(discussed further in Chapter 2).
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The pictured brain and brawn trends suggest a strong relationship between
the rise of female employment and skill-biased technical change. The combined
effect of changes in relative factor prices and factor supplies by gender on the wage
gap are computed from the following wage decomposition,








F j,f,T − F j,f,0
)}




F j,m − F j,f
)
(pj,T − pj,0) for j={brain,brawn},
where subscript 0 denotes the base year; wg,T is the average natural logarithmic
wage of gender g at time T ; pj is factor j’s return; and F j,g is the average sup-
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ply of factor j by gender g. Variables without time subscripts are averages of the
two years, 0 and T . Unlike Black and Spitz-Oener (2007), factor returns are not
allowed to vary across gender, since I argue men’s and women’s wages only differ
because of their relative brain and brawn supplies.3 Average factor demands by
gender can be computed from the brain and brawn estimates using United States
Census and CPS weights over time. Using standard explanatory variables (e.g.,
age, education) and an individual’s brain, brawn, and motor coordination factor
supplies, a log-linear wage regression is estimated to obtain factor returns. The
resulting coefficients on brain and brawn are taken as a proxy of factor returns (see
3Allowing factor returns to differ by gender results in slightly higher contributions of relative
price and supply changes on the evolution of the gender wage gap.
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Appendix A, Table A.2 for coefficient estimates). The percentage contribution to
movements in the wage gap through changes in relative factor supplies between men
and women is captured in the first term of equation (1.1). The second term mea-
sures the percentage contribution to movements in the wage gap through changes
in factor returns. These “quantity” and “price” percentages, combined, measure
the total percentage contribution to changes in the wage gap resulting from skill-
biased technical change between period 0 and period T. Table 1.1 provides a break-
down of these contributions for two time periods: 1950 to 1980 and 1980 to 2005.
Table 1.1: Wage Gap Decomposition
Percent Contribution 1950-1980a 1980-2005
Relative Brain Supply -0.91 13.58
Relative Brain Prices 1.05 2.39
Relative Brawn Supply 11.07 -0.19
Relative Brawn Prices -47.99 13.42
Total -36.79 29.20
Notes: Regression source data 1950 Census and 1980, 2005 CPS.
aWage gap widened during this period
Changes in brain and brawn over time can explain about one-third of the
changes in female to male average wages. As the gender wage gap widened from 1950
to 1980 the total contribution was negative, with 37 percent of the widening wage gap
mainly explained by rising returns to brawn. During this time period a fall in male
brawn supply actually prevented the gap from widening further. From 1980 to 2005,
the second period under consideration, the wage gap closed considerably. Relative
female to male brain supply growth and falling returns to brawn had approximately
equal impacts on the convergence of female to male wages.
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Given the above facts, I argue that beginning in the 1950s women entered
the labor market and their average wages improved due to the rise of brain-intensive
occupations, which complemented women’s comparative advantage. The remainder
of this chapter is devoted to the development of a model consistent with:
1. The rise of a brain-intensive sector;
2. The rise in women’s labor force participation;
3. Rising average female wages primarily driven by brain supply and brawn price
changes; and
4. An initial wage gap stagnation.
1.3 General Equilibrium Model
The simulated economy consists of a unit measure of agents,4 and two types
of occupations, one brain-intensive and the other brawn-intensive. The two occupa-
tions’ outputs are aggregated to a final market good, which is consumed by house-
holds. Agents can choose to work in the labor market or the home, and substitute
consumption between market and home produced goods.
4While the rise in labor force participation was considerably greater for married women, adding
married couples does not provided any further dynamics to the model.
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1.3.1 Household Maximization
Given evidence on the intensive and extensive margin of labor supply,5 it
is assumed that agents can either work full-time in the labor market or not at all,
`k = {0, 1} for agent k. Moreover, it is assumed that market and home produced
goods are prefect substitutes
U(c, ch) = ln (c+ ch) . (1.2)
Agent k maximizes this utility function subject to a standard budget constraint, the
home production technology, and a time constraint,
ck ≤ `kωk (1.3)
ch,k = Ah (1− `k) (1.4)
`k = {0, 1}. (1.5)
Agent k can earn the wage ωk = ψ(bk, rk), a function of his/her innate brain and
brawn abilities in the labor market. To determine this functional form it is necessary
to first describe the firm’s problem. Lastly, given the discrete labor choice, agents
work in the labor market if and only if
ωk > Ah. (1.6)
1.3.2 Production Process
There are two types of occupations, a brain-intensive production process, b,
and a brawn intensive production process, r. Each production process only uses one
5Single employed women worked nearly 40 hours per week in 1950 and slightly less than 40 hours
per week in 2005, while married women worked about 38 hours per week both in 1950 and 2005.
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of the inputs, brain Bb ≡ B or brawn Rr ≡ R, where B and R are the aggregated
individual labor supplies of brain and brawn. These brain and brawn units are






where Aj is occupation j’s factor productivity; εφ = 11−φ is the elasticity of sub-
stitution between the two occupations; and λj is occupation j’s production share,
with λb + λr = 1. A change in AbAr over time represents the exogenous skill-biased
technical progress.














with wb and wr representing the wages for brain and brawn occupations, respectively.
The relative wage is a function of relative factor productivity as well as relative
quantities supplied. Using equation (1.8), and the aggregate production function























where Lj equals either B or R, and the term in brackets is the unit cost of the
aggregate production.
1.3.3 Wages and the Distribution of Brain and Brawn
We can now explicitly state an agent’s wage, ωk, which is determined by
his/her innate brain and brawn ability. From the firm’s problem it follows that
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ωk = max{wbbk, wrrk}. Moreover, brain and brawn are jointly distributed (bk, rk) ∼
Ag(b, r) with differing distributions by gender. Since the premise of this study is the
lack of women’s brawn, the two gender distributions, Am(b, r) and Af (b, r), only
differ in their distribution of brawn, Rg. Consequently, the distribution of brain, B,
and the correlation of brain and brawn, ρ, are identical for men and women.
1.3.4 Decentralized Equilibrium
An equilibrium, given wages {wb, wr}, exists and is defined by:
1. The demand for market goods, ck, the production of household goods, ch,k,
and the supply of labor, `k, that maximizes household utility;
2. The demand for labor inputs, B and R, that minimizes the final good’s cost
function; and
3. Factor returns, {wb, wr} that clear,
(a) The labor market, Bhh = B and Rhh = R; and
(b) The goods market, Chh = Y ,
where Bhh, Rhh, and Chh are aggregate household supply and demand levels
obtained by integrating labor demand and market consumption of individuals
over the brain and brawn distribution of all working agents.
1.4 Analytical Dynamics
Data presented in Section 1.2 clearly depicts that labor moved away from
brawn and toward brain. Any technical change, defined as a change in Ab and
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Ar, mimicking the movement from brawn-intensive to brain-intensive occupations
must increase the relative demand for the brain-intensive efficiency units of labor.
I analyze the changes in labor demand, supply, and wages resulting from a “one
time” change in relative factor productivity, AbAr . The dynamics of a steady change
in relative technology parameters can be simply deduced by allowing this one time
change to occur repeatedly, where Aj,t = Aj,t−1 (1 + γj) with γj defined as sector
technology growth rates for j = {b, r}.
1.4.1 Relative Labor Demand












Taking the derivative of this relative demand with respect to AbAr , ceteris paribus,
results in the Proposition 1.4.1.
Proposition 1.4.1. A rise in relative factor productivity of brain-intensive occu-
pations increases relative labor demand efficiency units if εφ > 1, implying the two
occupations are substitutes in the aggregate production process, since
∂BR
∂ AbAr








Representing Proposition 1.4.1 graphically (see Figure 1.6), technological change
shifts labor demand to the right. Thus, the relative quantity of brain-intensive to
brawn-intensive labor efficiency units at any given wage ratio increases, and, as a
consequence, the equilibrium wage wbwr rises as long as an outward shift in labor
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supply does not offset the increase in labor demand. The relative wage equation
(1.8) shows that a rise in BR will offset relative demand increases since (φ− 1) < 0.
1.4.2 Labor Supply Decision
At the equilibrium wage rate, a change in relative factor productivity has
no effect on the labor supply threshold ωk > Ah. Therefore, the relative labor
supply does not shift and relative wages rise. However, a rise in the relative wage
will change the type of person who enters the labor market, since the effect on ωk
will depend on an agent’s innate brain and brawn levels. By normalizing wr = 1,
an agent with relatively low brain but high brawn will see no change in his/her
labor threshold, while an agent with relatively high brain will experience a rise in
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ωk and, therefore, might change his/her labor supply decision. An agent works in a







To illustrate the effects of a rise in relative wages on the labor supply decision
by gender, the following section elaborates on the dynamic effects by assuming
two independent uniform distributions for brain and brawn. Brain and brawn are
independently uniformly distributed with Bg ∼ [B,B] and Rg ∼ [Rg, Rg] for gender
g = {m, f}, where Rg = R+ xg, Rg = R+ xg, and the only difference between men
and women is the mean brawn level, xm > xf ≥ 0.












ag(b, r) db dr, (1.13)
where ag(b, r) is the joint probability density function. The first term represents all
agents that work in brain occupations, given home productivity and wages. The
second term represents all remaining working agents, i.e., agents that work in either
occupation. To not trivialize the results, it is assumed that B < Ahwb and Rg <
Ah
wr
, that is, some agents will not work in brain-intensive and/or brawn-intensive
occupations. Given these special distributional assumptions, LFPm > LFPf .














) > 0. (1.14)
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Proposition 1.4.3. As the returns to brain increase, ceteris paribus, the employ-

























) < 0. (1.16)
To summarize, increased demand for low-brawn occupations, coupled with their ris-
ing returns, leads to a shrinking gender employment gap given women’s comparative
advantage in brain.
1.4.3 Wage Gap Evolution
The wage gap is defined as average female to average male wages in terms




πfwBf + (1− πf )Rf
πmwBm + (1− πm)Rm
, (1.17)
where Bg is the average brain level conditional on the working population of gender





> wrwb ∧ ωg,k > Ah
)
. Similarly, Rg is the average
brawn conditional on the working population of gender g in brawn occupations, πg
is the fraction of working agents of gender g working in brain-intensive occupations,
and w = wbwr is the relative wage.
There are two opposing effects shaping the evolution of the wage gap, a
“price effect” and a “supply effect.”
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Thus, Proposition 1.4.4 holds if a greater fraction of women work in brain-
intensive occupations and their average relative brain to brawn efficiency-unit labor
supply is relatively higher than men’s, which I call the price effect. However, this
ignores any self-selection bias.
A rise in wb raises wages for agents with relatively high brain to brawn
ability levels. Moreover, a rise in wb, ceteris paribus, also enables agents with a
comparative advantage in brain, but lower brain ability compared to the working
population, to enter the labor market. Consequently, the average brain supply, Bg,
in the labor market may fall with a rise in relative wages. The fall in average brain
supply, however, will be greater for women than men. This second supply effect can
be illustrated by returning to the simplified example of the uniform distributions.















ag(b, r) db dr
LPFg
. (1.19)










































rg,k ag(b, r) db dr
, (1.21)
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where Bg and Rg equal the numerator of the conditional expectations, which are
the total brain and brawn supplies by gender g.
Given the distributions of brawn, that is, men’s higher average brawn levels
(xm > xf ), the total brawn supply of men is greater than that of women (Rm > Rf )
as long as some agents prefer to work in the brawn-intensive sector (wrRg > wbB).
Similarly, the total brain supply is greater for women than men as long as some
agents prefer to work in the brawn-intensive sector than stay at home (wrRg > Ah).
More importantly, a rise in the returns to brain-intensive occupations will have a
different effect on the average brain supplied by each gender, BgLPFg .








































where all terms are positive except for the last term, Ahwb LFPg − Bg, which can be
positive or negative. Since LFPf < LFPm and Bf > Bm from above, this last
term, which potentially slows the growth in the conditional mean brain supply, is
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smaller or negative for women compared to men. However, as women’s and men’s
total and sectoral-specific labor force participation rates converge over time, this
term will take the same value for men and women.
In summary, the price effect will close the wage gap, while the supply effect
will widen the wage gap. The supply effect will dominate when women’s labor force
participation is considerably lower than men’s, but will slowly disappear as these
labor force participation rates converge. The natural evolution of these effects will
initially cause a fall, or stagnation, of average female to male wages, which will close
as the price effect begins to dominate.
These analytical results suggest that a model differentiating between brain-
intensive and brawn-intensive jobs should replicate the initial United States em-
ployment and wage differences across gender. Moreover, it should reproduce the
subsequent evolution of the female labor force participation rate and the gender
wage gap, including some initial stagnation in average female wages as observed
during the 1960s and 1970s.
1.4.4 Simulation Model Modifications
Two model modifications are introduced to match relevant United States
data targets in the calibration. First, brain-intensive and brawn-intensive occupa-
tions utilize both input factors in linear combinations. Therefore, agents’ efficiency
wages are
ωk = max{wb(αbbk + (1− αb)rk), wr(αrbk + (1− αr)rk)}, (1.25)
25
where αb > αr. For the simplified example from Section 1.4.2, equation (1.25) im-
plies αb = 1 and αr = 0. Linearity in brain and brawn inputs allows the aggregation
of individual labor efficiency units by occupation,
Lj = αjBj + (1− αj)Rj , for j = {b, r}. (1.26)




wr(1− αr)− wb(1− αb)
> 1. (1.27)
The numerator is the difference in potential earnings of his/her brain ability between
brain and brawn occupations, and the denominator is the difference in potential
earnings between his/her brawn ability in brawn to brain occupations. If this ratio
is greater than one, i.e., the additional returns to brain in brain-intensive occupations
are greater than the additional returns to brawn in brawn-intensive occupations, the
agent chooses to work in a brain occupation.
The second modification extends the model with an education choice allow-
ing agents to increase their innate brain level. This modification enables the model
to match the observed trend in brain supply in the United States more precisely
(see Figure 1.4). Finitely lived myopic agents can choose to become educated when
young at a cost of bη, where η < 0. Education increases an agents brain endowment
to Be, such that all educated agents have the same brain level. However, education
is cheaper for agents with initially higher levels of brain. Given the myopic nature
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of agents, agent k who lives N periods chooses to become educated when,
1− βN
1− β
max {ln (max{wb(αbBe + (1− αb)rk),




max {ln (max{wb(αbbk + (1− αb)rk),
wr(αrbk + (1− αr)rk)}) , ln (Ah)} ,
where β is the discount factor. The first line of equation (1.28) represents the lifetime
utility of being educated, and the second line defines the lifetime utility of being
uneducated. Since agents with high brawn, who prefer to work in brawn-intensive
occupations, have less to gain from education, equation (1.28) is less likely to hold.
In the context of this study, where men have on average higher brawn levels than
women, fewer men will obtain education. As a consequence, average female brain
supply, Bf , surpasses average male brain supply, Bm, once the returns to brain are
sufficiently high to compensate for the cost of education. This is consistent with the
United States brain supply trends (see Figure 1.5), where women’s average brain
supply exceeds men’s average brain supply by the end of the 1980s. Therefore, in
addition to the price effect, the “education effect” also contributes to the closing
gender wage gap once the supply effect subsides.
1.5 Calibration
Simulating the model over time requires the calibration of individuals’ brain
and brawn distributions, and several household and production parameters. Given
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the pronounced hump-shape in the wage gap between 1940 and 1960, possibly due
to the effects of World War II, the model is matched to various 1960 data targets.
1.5.1 Production Parameter Estimation
To determine the production parameters, Ab and Ar, their growth rates,
γb and γr, and the substitution parameter, φ, the regression of Katz and Murphy
(1992, pg. 69) is reestimated, where skilled labor is defined as brain-intensive labor
and unskilled labor is defined as brawn-intensive labor. Occupations are sorted by
their relative brain to brawn inputs in such a way that occupations with b > r
are brain-intensive and occupations with b < r are brawn-intensive (see Figure 1.3).
Full-time workers6 are grouped according to their age group (eight five-year intervals
from 25 to 64 years old), gender, education (less than high school, high school, some
college, college), race (white, black, other), marital status (married, single), sector
(industry, services), and the type of occupation (brain-intensive, brawn-intensive).











the average hourly wage of group k over the average hourly wage of the whole
population (across individuals over the entire time period). The resulting relative
6Full-time workers are defined as working at least 39 weeks and 35 hours per week (prior to 1976
only hours worked prior to the survey week are recorded).
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unit wage of brain over brawn and relative efficiency unit labor supply is shown in







= ζ0 + ζ1t+ ηt, (1.31)
as in Krusell et al. (1997). Taking the natural logarithm of the relative wage equation



















+ φζ0, a1 = φζ1, a2 = φ − 1, and EbEr is the relative efficiency
unit of brain-intensive to brawn-intensive occupations. Table A.3 in Appendix A
provides the regression estimates. By normalizing ζ0 to zero, the parameter values
of the annual skill-biased technical change growth rate, γb−γr, and the substitution
parameter, φ, are obtained (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.2: Baseline Parameters
Production Parameters
Substitution Parameter φ 0.6032
Difference in Annual Relative TFP Growth Rate γb − γr 0.0147
Additionally, the relative factor productivity, AbAr , is normalized to one in 1960 and λb
is set to match the 1960 labor share of brain-intensive occupations in the economy,
which is about 51 percent. Lastly, the productivity parameters within occupations,
αb and αr, are matched to brain and brawn standard deviations in 1960 for each
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occupation (see Figure 1.7), together with the remainder of the parameters deter-
mining the distribution of brain and brawn of all individuals (see Section 1.5.2).
The fairly steady brain and brawn standard deviations over time suggest that the
grouping of occupations is fairly robust over time and appropriate for the simulation
exercise.7
1.5.2 Agents’ Ability
Brain and brawn are assumed to be joint normally distributed with corre-
lation ρ. This assumption requires six parameter estimates: the mean of brain, µb;
7Other statistics (e.g., standard deviation, minimum, maximum) of this specific occupational
classification are also fairly steady over time.
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the standard deviation of brain, σb; the two means of brawn, µr,m and µr,f ; the stan-
dard deviation of brawn, σr; and the correlation, ρ. Nine data targets are selected
to match nine parameters - the six parameters above, plus αb and αr from Section
1.5.1, and home productivity, Ah. The specific 1960 United States data targets are:
1. Female labor force participation;
2. Standard deviation of male brain supply;
3. Standard deviation of female brain supply;
4. Standard deviation of male brawn supply;
5. Standard deviation of female brawn supply;
6. Standard deviation of the brain-intensive occupation’s brain supply;
7. Standard deviation of the brain-intensive occupation’s brawn supply;
8. Standard deviation of the brawn-intensive occupation’s brain supply; and
9. Standard deviation of the brawn-intensive occupation’s brawn supply.
The standard deviations of brain and brawn by occupation provide a good repre-
sentation of the economy. The standard deviations of male and female brain and
brawn measure the main differences between gender in this study, i.e., women’s
lower brawn supplies, and men’s and women’s similar brain endowments. Lastly, η
and Be are matched to the difference in the standard deviations of female to male
brain in 2005 and the difference in female to male brain-intensive labor shares in
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2005. Both these measures, combined with the 1960 data targets, provide valuable
information on the differences between men’s and women’s brain supply over time.
Parameters are obtained from preforming simulated annealing. To check
the robustness of the estimates, the calibration is repeated numerous times with
different initial parameter values chosen randomly from a grid of plausible values.
The labor market trends discussed below are robust to all calibrations.
1.5.3 1960 Model Moments and Calibrated Parameters
Before analyzing the resulting employment and wage trends, Table 1.3 pro-
vides the parameter estimates and specific data targets of the calibration.
Table 1.3: Moments and Parameter Estimates
Moment 1960s Data Model Parameters
Brain Occupation Labor Share 0.51 0.48 λb = 0.47
Women Labor Force Participation 0.4 0.31 Ah = 1.54
Female Brain Std. Dev. -0.03 -0.04 µb = 2.70
Male Brain Std. Dev. 0.11 0.02 µr,m = 2.29
Female Brawn Std. Dev. -0.61 -0.61 µr,f = 0.76
Male Brawn Std. Dev. 0.05 0.19 σb = 2.03
Brawn-intensive Occupation’s Brain Std. Dev. -0.63 -0.63 σr = 1.03
Brain-intensive Occupation’s Brain Std. Dev. 0.73 0.71 ρ = −0.98
Brawn-intensive Occupation’s Brawn Std. Dev. 0.63 0.63 αb = 0.47
Brain-intensive Occupation’s Brawn Std. Dev. -0.91 -0.91 αr = 0.24
The model closely matches the brain and brawn standard deviations for both
occupations and women. While men’s brain and brawn levels are not matched, this
calibration still captures the differences between men and women. That is, women
supply considerably less brawn, but similar brain. The model is unable to match
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the initial female labor force participation, underestimating it by nine percentage
points. However, the model is able to generate a large difference in average female
to male wages, where women earn about 66 percent of men’s wages (four percentage
points higher than in the data). Note that the wage gap is not a data target in the
calibration.
1.6 Main Results
The results presented in this section show that the mechanism highlighted
in this study does well in matching rising female employment rates in the United
States. Moreover, the estimated growth rate difference between brain and brawn-
intensive occupations, γb − γr = 0.0147, does extremely well in matching the rise
in brain-intensive labor shares, not only for the economy as a whole, but also for
men and women (see Figure 1.8, where dashed lines are the simulated labor share
trends). In addition, the base model with education matches both the shape and
magnitude of the wage gap from 1960 to 2005. In contrast, the counterfactual model
without education is unable to match the wage gap evolution beyond the period of
stagnant average female to male wages.
1.6.1 Simulated Employment and Wage Gap Trends
This model generates a linear rise in female labor force participation. Table
1.4 provides 1960 and 2005 labor force participation rates for women from the base
model and the counterfactual model without education.
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Table 1.4: Change in Women’s Labor Force Participation
United Base Counterfactual
States (%) Model (%) Model (%)
1960 40.12 31.37 31.37
2005 71.39 56.10 54.85
Percent Explained 79.12 75.11
Both the base model and the model without education generate a large linear
rise in female labor force participation, explaining about 75 to 79 percent of the total
rise observed in the data. The rise in labor force participation is almost identical
across the two models, suggesting that the rise in the returns to brain, rather than
the modeled educational choice, is the primary driving force behind women’s labor
34






































force participation. Men’s labor force participation is 100 percent in the model
economy, in comparison to United States male labor force participation rates of 92
percent and 87 percent in 1960 and 2005, respectively.
The wage gap evolution, however, differs considerably between the two mod-
els. In the counterfactual model the supply effect dominates throughout the entire
period, resulting in a virtually flat wage gap (see Figure 1.9). A large fraction of the
stagnant wage gap in the counterfactual model is driven by the fact that women’s
average brain supply does not surpass men’s average brain supply. Figure 1.10 shows
female and male brain and brawn supply standard deviations over time. Although
women’s brain supply eventually exceeds that of men in the data, the model without
education is unable to generate this effect. Therefore, I calibrate the base model
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with education to match the difference between men’s and women’s 2005 brain stan-
dard deviations. That is, given women’s comparative advantage in brain, women
are more likely to increase their educational investment once the returns to brain
rise. As a consequence, women eventually surpass men in average brain supplies.
From the 1960s to the 1980s the model with education perfectly parallels
the counterfactual model (see Figure 1.9), with both models producing virtually
stagnant gender wage ratios. The models generate a 0.6 percentage point decrease
in average female to male wages during these three decades, compared to a 1.6
percentage point fall in the data. Therefore, about 38 percent of the fall in the
United States female to male wage ratio is explained by the models. However,
starting around 1980, the base model is able to simulate most of the closing gender
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wage gap observed in the United States. The base model generates a rise of 14
percentage points in average female to male wages from 1980 to 2005, compared to
a 17 percentage point increase in the data, thus replicating about 83 percent of the
closing wage gap during this time period. The model with education generates a
closing wage gap through its ability to match the faster relative rise in female brain
supply, which ultimately exceeds men’s average brain supply by about 0.15 standard
deviations in 2005.
1.7 Extension: Married Households
I have, thus far, ignored addressing differences in married versus single
women’s labor force participation (see Figure 1.11). To model differences in la-
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bor force participation between single and married households, the assumption of
perfect substitution between market and home production must be relaxed. If house-
holds maximize a CES utility function, where market and home goods are gross
substitutes, the labor threshold, ωg > T`(Ah), will differ across married and sin-
gle households. The single household’s labor supply decision is identical to Section
1.3 assuming a discrete labor choice. Therefore, ωg > Ah still determines a single
agent’s decision to work or stay at home. A married household, however, now has
the following utility function






where the substitution between market and home goods equals εν = 11−ν . In a
static environment, married household k maximizes this utility function subject to





ck ≤ `f,kωf,k + `m,kωm,k, (1.35)
ch,k = Ah (1− `f,k + 1− `m,k) (1.36)
`f,k = {0, 1} and `m,k = {0, 1}. (1.37)
With perfect substitution in home production, households specialize with the higher
wage earner, ω1,k ≥ ω2,k, entering the labor market first. In households with equal
wage rates the primary worker is assumed to be male, 1 ≡ m. The primary wage
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earner of household k works in the market if and only if
ω1,k > Ah (2ν − 1)1/ν .8 (1.38)
The secondary wage earner enters the market if and only if the above condition is






)1/ν − ω1,k. (1.39)
That is, the secondary agent’s labor supply decision is also dependent on his/her
spouse’s wage. The higher a spouse’s wage the less likely the secondary worker is
to enter the labor market due to imperfect substitution between market and home






)1/ν−1 − 1, (1.40)
which is positive as long as Ah > 0. This dependence on spousal wages incentivizes
married women to stay at home unless their wages are very attractive. However, the
general mechanism behind the closing wage and employment gaps will not change.
Due to the computational burden of calibrating the married household model, I
leave this extension for future research. Moreover, there is little evidence about the
appropriate matching function of brain and brawn abilities between spouses, except
for some evidence of assortive matching in educational attainment.
8Note this is similar to the single agent’s labor supply threshold, except for a scaling factor of
(2ν − 1)1/ν .
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1.8 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to assess the importance of labor demand
changes on women’s labor force participation and wages. For proper policy de-
velopment, it is necessary to establish the extent to which the female labor market
experience has been shaped by discrimination or other factors. This study focuses
on the changes in occupational brain and brawn input requirements, and their effect
on women’s labor force participation and average wages. A considerable rise in brain
and fall in brawn requirements is estimated from the 1977 DOT. Preliminary time
trends and wage regression estimates suggest these labor demand changes have had
a sizable impact on women’s wages and employment. Using a Mincer-type wage re-
gression to estimate brain and brawn factor returns, I find the fall in relative brawn
prices and the rise in female to male brain supplies to explain about 30 percent of
both the initial stagnation and later rise of the post-World War II United States
wage gap. The simulation of the general equilibrium model provides further insight
into the dynamics of these labor demand changes, and their quantitative impact on
women’s labor force participation and the closing wage gap. Calibrating the model
to the 1960s United States economy shows that skill-biased technical change is able
to replicate about 79 percent of the rise in female labor force participation. While
the model without education is unable to generate a closing wage gap, the base
model with an educational choice is able to generate a similar trend as observed in
the data. This model explains about 37 percent of the initial fall and 83 percent of
the later rise in the female to male wage ratio.
Clearly, the simple model presented in this chapter, abstracting from many
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other potential factors influencing men’s and women’s labor market experiences,
is unable to explain the complete evolution of the labor market over the last five
decades. While this model is successful in explaining a significant portion of the
changes in women’s labor market experience, it fails to match certain aspects of
men’s labor market experience.
Some questions remain for future research. This study does not differentiate
between married and single households. While theory suggests the general trends
will still hold for a model differentiating between married and single households, I
would like to quantify the explanatory power of a model accounting for marriage.
Secondly, the model has made some simplifying assumptions, such as modeling
skill-biased technical change as an exogenous process. The next research step is
endogenizing this process by developing a model where the entrance of women into
the labor force possibly spurs the skill-biased technological change observed in the
data. Moreover, the educational choice in this study is very simplistic. A more
realistic and richer educational investment choice over an agent’s lifetime should
be of interest. Lastly, the model calibrated to the 1960s United States economy is
unable to match men’s declining brawn supply, suggesting the above model should




This chapter argues for a strong link between the rise in the proportion of
educated women and the evolution of the marriage and divorce rates since mid-
century. As women become increasingly educated their bargaining power within
marriage rises and their economic situation in singlehood improves, making mar-
riage less attractive and divorce more attractive. Similarly, a change in the divorce
regime (e.g. unilateral divorce laws in the 1970s), making marriages less stable,
incentivizes women to seek education as insurance against the higher divorce risk.
A framework that models the interdependence between education, marriage and di-
vorce is developed, simulated, and contrasted against United States data evidence.1
2.1 Introduction
Most countries have seen a rise in educational investment, a rise in women’s
labor force participation, and a rise in divorce rates in conjunction with fall in
marriage rate over the last five decades. According to estimates by Goldin et al.
(2006), the discrepancy between male and female college enrollment reached 2.3 men
to 1 woman attending college in 1947. However, since 1947, the proportion of women
enrolling in college has risen continuously compared to men. In 1950, 24 percent of
1The material in this chapter is based on an ongoing joint project with Fatih Guvenen.
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men aged 25 to 30 had some college education, compared to 18 percent of women,
implying a ratio of 1.3; in 2000, these number were 55 percent, 61 percent, and 0.9,
respectively; and by the mid-1980s the gender education gap of men and women
with at least some college education had disappeared.2 González and Viitanen
(2006) find that almost all European countries had divorce rates below 2.5 divorces
per 1,000 married people in 1960, including many with less than one. But by
2002, most of Europe experienced five or more divorces per 1,000 married people.
Similarly, divorce rates in the United States doubled from roughly 10 divorces per
1,000 married women in 1950 to about 19 by 2000. Lastly, McGrattan and Rogerson
(1998) find that age 35 to 54 married women’s average weekly hours worked rose
from less than 10 hours in 1950 to over 25 hours at the end of the century, while
hours worked remained fairly steady for men and single women.
Given the rise in the college wage premium during the second half of the
20th century, the rise in the proportion of women seeking some college education is
a natural response. However, women’s wages and labor force participation rates are
still lower than men’s for all education levels, and as a consequence, the reversal of
the education gap can be puzzling.
In this chapter we argue that a shift in labor and marriage markets had
large effects on women’s college enrollment, and at the same time women’s educa-
tional investments had large effects on labor and marriage markets. A framework
is developed that simultaneously models the interdependent relationship of three
2Sources: 1950 United States Census Integrated Public Use Micro-data Samples (IPUMS-USA,
Ruggles et al., 2004) and 2000 Current Population Survey Integrated Public Use Micro-data Samples
(IPUMS-CPS, King et al., 2004)
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life choices: education, work, and marriage/divorce. The main focus is the addi-
tional benefit of education as a form of insurance in an economy with increasing
divorce risks. An overlapping generations model is proposed, where agents make
intratemporal labor decisions, intertemporal marital decisions and a one-time edu-
cation decision when young. There are four types of agents, who differ in gender
(men and women) and education (some college or none). In marriage agents con-
sume a public good and an additional utility from love. When love turns “bad”
agents can divorce. However, who has the final say in dissolving the marriage de-
pends on the divorce regime (consent or unilateral). Under consent divorce laws the
lower earning spouse is protect from involuntary marriage dissolution. There is no
monetary divorce cost, however, upon divorce, an individual remains single for one
period, while a single individual meets one potential spouse each period.
In the context of the model, the effects of a rise in the college wage premium
and the effects of a switch in divorce laws, from consent divorce to unilateral divorce,
are analyzed. A rise in the college wage premium results in a higher fraction of
educated women, higher labor force participation and a rise in the divorce probability
under consent divorce laws and a fall under unilateral divorce laws. The effects of
a rise in the wage premium on marriage rates is ambiguous, since higher earning
women are less likely to marry, but men prefer to marry higher earning spouses. A
switch in divorce laws leads to an initial jump in the divorce rate, but a later decline,
since marriages that are entered into under unilateral divorce laws are “better”
(selection effect). Moreover, with a switch to unilateral divorce laws, the risk of
divorce rises, and women obtain more education in an effort to insure themselves
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against the possible adverse effect of a divorce. These analytical implications of
the model are consistent with empirical findings, for example Keeley (1977) finds
that high earning men marry early in life, while high earning women marry late.
Weiss and Willis (1997) find that an unexpected positive shock to earnings capacity
makes the marriage more stable if it affects the husband’s earnings and less stable
if it affects the wife’s earnings.
Cvrcek (2007) argues that woman’s household role first changed in the late
19th and early 20th century. During this time period fertility fell, marriage first
declined and then rose again, and women became an increasing presence in the
labor market, first as single and later as married women. In the last five decades
another significant reversal in woman’s household role took place with a rise in
education and divorce.
In explaining the reversal in the education gap, previous research has fo-
cused on higher female returns to education in marriage. For example, Peña (2007)
reproduces the evolution of the education trends by modeling returns to education
in marriage. Women obtain higher returns to education in the marriage market,
since the gender ratio is tipped toward women, who, therefore, compete for men
in the marriage market. Consequently, even though women receive lower returns
to education in the labor market, they invest more in education as they compete
for a “better” spouse. Lafortune (2008) studies the effects of gender imbalances on
pre-martial schooling investment within immigrant populations in the late 19th and
early 20th century obtaining similar results. Chiappori et al. (2006) argue that the
smaller gender wage gap for higher education levels, combined with the fall in house-
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hold labor hours, can explain women’s higher educational attainment. Mulligan and
Rubinstein (2005) provide empirical evidence of a smaller education gap for highly
educated women, with advanced college degrees. Lastly, Ŕıos-Rull and Sañchez-
Marcos (2002) develop a model to account for the gender education gap prior to the
1970s, where the gap can best be accounted for by assuming that women are more
expensive to educate.
In this study, similar to most of the previous literature, educated women
have better matching opportunities. However, rather than focusing on the returns
to education in marriage with the declining marriage rates, we focus on the effects of
divorce risks on educational choices and vice versa. The model is able to replicated
most of the evolution in divorce rates for the United States. Moreover, from 1950 to
2000, it generates a 28 to 33 percentage point rise in the fraction of educated women,
and a 9 to 17 percentage point rise in the fraction of educated men, compared
to a 43 and 31 percentage point rise in the United States for women and men,
respectively. The rise in the college wage premium alone can explain anywhere from
30 to 43 percent of the rise in the United States’ fraction of women with some college
education, and anywhere from 9 to 37 percent for men, depending on the assumed
real wage growth rate from 1950 to 2000. Similarly, a switch in divorce laws, from
consent to unilateral, generates about 37 and 20 percent of the observed rise in
the fraction of educated individuals for women and men, respectively. Moreover,
the model does well in replicating average weekly hours worked and the level of
assortive matching in marriage. However, it fails in matching the sharp decline in
marriage rates over the last five decades.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows, Section 2.2 provides
United States facts on education, marriage, divorce and the labor market central to
the discussion of this chapter. Section 2.3 outlines a simplified version of the model
to provide the analytical results of the link between educational investments and
divorce rates in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the model calibration and Section
2.6 provides the main results. Section 2.7 concludes. Mathematical derivations are
left to the appendix, while the intuitive results are provided within the text.
2.2 Stylized Facts
The facts on educational attainment, the marriage market and the labor
market central to the discussion are outlined below. All statistics reported in this
section are derived from the 1950 and 1960 United States Census Integrated Public
Use Micro-data Samples (IPUMS-USA) and from the 1962-2005 Current Population
Survey Integrated Public Use Micro-data Samples (IPUMS-CPS), unless otherwise
noted.
The fraction of the population aged 25 to 30 with some college education
started rising in the late 1960s. However, while the fraction of women with some
college education has steadily risen, the fraction of men with some college education
leveled off initially in the early 1980s and then, after a small rise, again in the mid-
1990s. As a consequence, women had surpassed men in their educational investment
by 1990 (see Figure 2.1). As previously mentioned, various papers have suggested
that women have higher returns to education in marriage, thus explaining part of the
reversal in educational attainment. However, this theory is becoming less plausible
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as marriage rates continue to decline.
Data from various National Vital Statistics Reports shows that the marriage
rate halved in the the last five decades going from about 90 marriages per 1,000
unmarried women over the age of 15 to only 45 marriages. At the same time the
divorce rate doubled, from roughly 10 divorces per 1,000 married women over the
age of 15 to about 19 (see Figure 2.2). Thus, studying the link between divorce and
education should be of greater interest, especially starting in the mid-1970s when
divorce rates rose drastically, partially due to the introduction of unilateral divorce
laws (for a discussion of the effects on the divorce rate in the switch to unilateral
divorce laws see, Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006).
To insure against the rise in divorce rates, women who foresee a divorce are
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more likely to enter the labor market. For example, Johnson and Skinner (1986)
find that a divorce increases the probability of participating in the labor market
by about 20 percent within the last three years of marriage (see also Montalto,
1994, for similar results). In a similar manner, we argue that women seek more
education to insure against the higher risk of divorce and exposure to single life.
Intermediate estimation results form the study by Brenner et al. (1992) provide
some evidence in support. The authors goal is to determine how important the rise
in divorce risk has been in explaining the fall in aggregate savings. They estimate
a simultaneous regression, were one regression estimates the relationship between a
women’s decision to become a student and the anticipated divorce rate. The authors
conclude that a rise in divorce rates causes women to shift investment from financial
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and physical assets to investment in education and work experience.
Lastly, we can observe a “catching up” in women’s wages for both women
with and without some college education (see Table 2.1), where 1950 male wages
with some college are normalized to one. Table 2.1 also reports the implied com-
pounded annual growth rates in wages from 1950 to 2000. The rise in the college
wage premium is evident, particularly for women with a 0.26 percent higher annual
growth rate from 1950 to 2000. Moreover, growth rates for women with some college
education have closed the gender gap faster, with educated women’s wages growing
annually 0.31 percent faster than educated men’s wages compared to a 0.17 percent
growth difference for uneducated individuals.
Table 2.1: Wages and Wage Growth Rates by Gender and Education
Education Group 1950 2000 CAGR (%)
Male with Some College 1 1.50 0.82
Male with No College 0.71 1.01 0.70
Female with Some College 0.67 1.18 1.13
Female with No College 0.50 0.77 0.87
Using this evidence on educational investment, and marriage and labor mar-
kets, the following section develops a model of educational investment, labor and
marital choices, to explore the relationship between educational investment and the
evolution of divorce rates.
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2.3 Model Linking Education and Marital Choices
The model is largely based on the search-framework developed by Mortensen
(1988) and closely follows the model by Greenwood and Guner (2004) who model
the rise in female labor force participation through the rise in home technology.
To model the possible feedback between educational investment, divorce risks, and
marital choices, we develop an overlapping generations model with education, labor,
marriage, and divorce. Agents live for N periods, and choose whether to attend
college (“become educated”) at a cost in period n = 0. During the remainder of
their lives agents divide their time between home and market production, where
they earn a market wage dependent on their educational attainment and gender.
Agents also choose each period to marry, divorce or remain single.
To provide some intuition behind the results obtained in the simulation,
we first develop a “three” period (including period zero) model without remarriage,
where agents choose between attending college or not when young. In the simulation,
the model is extended to N periods to allow for the possibility of remarriage.
2.3.1 Timing
Agents do not consume or work at age zero and only decided if to attend
school. The cost of attending college can be spread over an agents lifetime. However,
education is a permanent characteristic and remains constant after period zero. In
period one an agent meets one individual of opposite sex from the same generation
for certain. Upon meeting, each individual draws a love utility, bg ∼ S(b), where
this love draw is additive to the utility of consumption in marriage, and is allowed to
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Figure 2.3: Three Period Model Timing
n = 0 n = 1 n = 2
choose whether to pay cost κ and 
become educated or not
meet an individual 
of opposite sex, 
draw love quality 
(bm,bf)
marry or remain 
single
work and consume 
goods
if married decided whether to 
remain married or divorce after 
drawing love shock (ε)
work and consume 
goods
end of life
differ between spouses. Agents decide to marry or remain single. Marriage can only
occur when both parties agree. Old married couples draw an additional love shock
ε ∼M(ε), i.e. the utility form marriage after one period evolves to b′g = bg + ε. This
love shock does not differ between spouses. Given the new love utility, couples decide
to remain married or divorce. There is no marriage market for old agents, and there
is no possibility of remarriage in this simplified three period model. In addition,
in periods one and two households maximize a intratemporal utility function over
purchased market goods, ck, home produced goods, hk, and time spent at home, nk,
where an agent’s wages is determined by his/her gender and education. The timing
of event within a lifetime is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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2.3.2 Household Decisions
A household chooses if to attend college in period zero, how much time
to allocate to home and market production, whether to marry and remain single
in period one, and between remaining married or divorcing in period two. We
start with the household labor allocation, then determine the marriage and divorce
decision, and, lastly, describe the education choice.
2.3.2.1 Household Intratemporal Utility Maximization






g,k + (1− γs)hαg,k
] 1
α where g = f,m and k = u, e (2.1)
s.t.
cg,k ≤ ωg,k(1− ng,k) (2.2)
hg,k = Ahng,k (2.3)
0 ≤ ng,k ≤ 1, (2.4)
where {g, e} stands for an educated individual of sex g and {g, u} for an uneducated
individual. Ah is a home productivity factor, ωg,k is the wage which depends on an
individual’s sex and education, γs is the weight a single household puts on market
produced goods and σα = 11−α is the elasticity of substitution parameter. The
price of the market produced good is set to one, and the shadow price of the home
produced good is ωg,kAh .
Substituting the budget constraint (2.2) and the home technology function
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(2.3) into (2.1) and maximizing with respect to ng,k yields time allocation,
ng,k =
(1− γs)σα





where 0 < ng,k < 1 if 0 < γs < 1. As a consequence, the maximized intratemporal












Assuming that consumption is shared equally among both spouses, a mar-
ried household {k, k∗}, where an asterisk denotes the spouse, maximizes the same
intratemporal utility function, only the budget constraint (2.2) and the home pro-
duction function (2.3) are adjusted to account for two individuals. That is,
ck,k∗ ≤ ωf,k(1− nf,k,k∗) + ωm,k∗(1− nm,k,k∗), (2.7)
hk,k∗ = Ah(nf,k,k∗ + nm,k,k∗), (2.8)
0 ≤ nf,k,k∗ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ nm,k,k∗ ≤ 1, (2.9)
where k = u, e and k∗ = u, e.
Perfect time substitution between spouses in home production leads to specialization
in the labor market, with the higher wage earner entering the labor market first.
















where γc is the weight couples put on market goods consumptions. A secondary





































As a consequence, if only the primary earner works, and assuming an interior solu-




























2.3.2.2 Marriage and Divorce Decision
The assumptions of no remarriage, no cost to divorce, and public goods
consumption in marriage, yields the following condition on the love quality for an
individual of type k to prefer marriage to type k∗,
Uk,k∗ + bg,k,k∗ ≥ Ug,k. (2.16)
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Consequently, the love threshold to marry and divorce, for individual k of gender g
and spouse k∗, is
bg,k,k∗ = Ug,k − Uk,k∗ . (2.17)
2.3.2.3 Education Decision
To determine the threshold for attending college, we need to obtain agents’














U1k,k∗+ · · ·




U2k,k∗+ · · · (2.18)
E(bg,k,k∗ + ε|1c = 1,1d = 0)] + E(Pd,k,k∗)U2g,k
]]}
,
where superscripts denote the time period, 1c is the indicator function for being
married and 1d is the indicator function for divorcing, and Pc,k,k∗ is the probability
for a type k agent to marry a type k∗ agent, Pd,k,k∗ is the probability for a type
{k, k∗} couple to divorce and g∗j is the probability of meeting a j educated individual
of the opposite sex. For example, me is the probability for a woman to meet an
educated male, which, in this three period model, is also the fraction of educated
men for each generation. Given the cost κg to attend college, an agent of gender g
will attend college if
Vg,e − κg ≥ Vg,u. (2.19)
Consequently, the cost threshold to become educated is,
κg = Vg,e − Vg,u. (2.20)
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2.3.3 Marriage, Divorce and Education Rates
Assuming a distribution of κg ∼ K(κ) across the gender g population, the
fraction of educated agents of gender g, ge, for any generation is,
ge = P (κg ≤ Vg,e − Vg,u), for g = f,m. (2.21)
The probability that a marriage between two agents of type {g, k} and
{g∗, k∗} ensues is,
Pc,k,k∗ = P (b ≥ bg,k,k∗)P (b ≥ bg∗,k,k∗). (2.22)
The probability of divorce depends on the current divorce law: consent or
unilateral. In the case of consent divorce, and assuming that agents experience
the same love shock ε when old, the agent with the lower divorce probability will
ultimately decide on the divorce, that is
Pd,k,k∗ = min{P (bg,k,k∗ + ε ≤ bg,k,k∗), P (bg∗,k,k∗ + ε ≤ bg∗,k,k∗)}, (2.23)
while with unilateral divorce laws, the probability of divorce is
Pd,k,k∗ = max{P (bg,k,k∗ + ε ≤ bg,k,k∗), P (bg∗,k,k∗ + ε ≤ bg∗,k,k∗)}. (2.24)
With the marriage and divorce probabilities, and the fraction of educated
individuals, it is possible to determine the marriage rate, MR, and the divorce rate,
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We can now define a stationary equilibrium. it consists of the decision rules
for time allocated to home production {ng,k, ng,k,k∗}, the marriage decision rule 1c ={
1 if b ≥ bg,k,k∗
0 otherwise
, the divorce decision rule 1d =
{
1 if b+ ε ≤ bg,k,k∗
0 otherwise
, and the
value functions Vg,k, such that the decision rules solve the household maximization
problem, and individual and aggregate behavior is consistent. Thus, the fraction of
educated and uneducated agents {fj ,mj}, which are fixed points of equation (2.21),
are consistent with agents’s beliefs of the probabilities of meeting an educated or
uneducated potential spouse.
2.4 Model Dynamics
To account for the bidirectional relationship between the rise in education
and the evolution of marriage and divorce rates, the following analysis focuses on
the effects of a rising college wage premium, and the effects of the introduction of
non-unilateral divorce laws on educational investment and marital choices. For ease
of presentation, the following assumptions are imposed:
























4. κf ∼ U(κl,f , κf,u), b ∼ U(bl, bu), and ε ∼ U(εl, εu); and, lastly,
5. κm ∼ U(0, 0).
Assumption (1) guarantees that all women are secondary workers, (2) and (3) pro-
vide interior solutions for n2,k,k∗ , (4) allows me to derive relevant probabilities ex-
plicitly, and (5) yields me = 1 by (2.21) since Vg,k is increasing in wages, which
simplifies the notation and analytical results. To provide a short overview of the
intuition derivations are left to Appendix B.
2.4.1 Who Marries?
The threshold of marriage and divorce depends on the primary and secondary
wage, and together with equations (2.22), (2.23) or (2.24) determines who is more
likely to be married and to whom. Since the focus is on the effects of a rising
return to education on women’s education choices, and women are by assumption
(1) secondary workers, we analyze the effects of a rise of ω2,k only. Note, since all
men are educated, the spouses subscript k∗ is omitted.











b1,k > b2,k. (2.29)
Proposition 2.4.1 implies the following ordering of love thresholds b1,uf > b1,ef >
b2,ef > b2,uf . Consequently, whether educated or uneducated women are more likely
to marry is unclear. Divorce is decided by the secondary worker under consent
divorce laws and by the primary worker under unilateral divorce laws from (2.29).
The expected probability of divorcing, conditional on marrying in period one, under
consent divorce, is
E(Pd|1c = 1) =
.5(b2,k − bu)− εl
εu − εl
, (2.30)
and, under unilateral divorce, is
E(Pd|1c = 1) =
.5(b1,k − bu)− εl
εu − εl
. (2.31)
Equation (2.28) implies that under consent divorce law, couples with an educated
woman are more likely to divorce, while (2.27) implies that under unilateral divorce
law marriages with an uneducated woman are more likely to dissolve.
2.4.2 The Effects of Liberalizing Divorce Laws
As previously mentioned, a switch from consent to unilateral divorce law
changes the decision of divorcing from the secondary to the primary wage earner.
Given the assumption of no divorce costs the marriage probabilities remain unaf-
fected. However, given b1,k > b2,k, the divorce rate will initially “jump up” with the
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divorce law switch, as observed in the United States (see Figure 2.2 of Section 2.2).
As the probability of a marriage ending in divorce is lower when the wife is educated
under the unilateral divorce, the divorce rate will fall over time if the fraction of
educated women does not fall.
To determine if a switch in divorce regimes leads to a rise in the fraction
of educated women, we simplify equation (2.18) by substituting the distributional
assumptions on b and ε, and assume no wage growth,
















A move to unilateral divorce will increase the fraction of educated women since
only the term (1−E(Pd,k)) is affected under the change and (1−E(Pd,ef ,uni)) >
(1−E(Pd,uf ,uni)) with unilateral divorce and (1−E(Pd,ef ,con)) < (1−E(Pd,uf ,con))
under consent divorce. These results follow from combining the effects of a rise in
ω2,k on the divorce threshold, from equations (2.27) and (2.28), and the expected
divorce probabilities (2.30) and (2.31).
Proposition 2.4.2. The fraction of educated women rises with a switch to unilateral
divorce laws:
fe,uni = P (κf < (Vf,e − Vf,u)uni) > P
(
κf < (Vef − Vf,u)con
)
= fe,con, (2.33)
as (Vf,e − Vf,u)uni > (Vf,e − Vf,u)con.
The initial jump, and subsequent fall in divorce rates, is what Rasul (2006) terms
the pipeline and selection effects of a switch to unilateral divorce laws, also observed
61
in Figure 2.2 of Section 2.2 for the case of the United States. In contrast, the effect
on the marriage rate is ambiguous and will depend on whether Pc,ef is greater or
less than Pc,uf , i.e. if Pc,ef < Pc,uf the marriage rate will fall.
2.4.3 The Effects of a Rising College Premium
A rise in the returns to education, ωf,e, results in an increase in the fraction
of educated women since ∂Vf,k∂ω2,k > 0. Given (2.27)−(2.29), and a rise in the returns to
education divorce probabilities for educated women will fall under unilateral divorce
and rise under consent divorce.
In conclusion, a switch from consent to unilateral divorce will lead to (1) a
rise in female educational investment, (2) an initial rise in the divorce rate, with a
later decline, and (3) either a fall or rise in the marriage rate. A rise in the returns
to education (1) dampens the initial jump in divorce rates resulting from the regime
switch, (2) accelerates the later decline, and (3) increases the fraction of educated
women. The effect on divorce rates prior to the divorce law switch depends on the
marriage probabilities, i.e. the effect here is ambiguous since men prefer to marry
women of higher earning potential, but women of higher earning potential are less
likely to marry.
2.5 Model Calibration
To test the validity of the model in explaining divorce and education trends
in the United States, the three period model is extended to N periods.
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2.5.1 N Period Model with Remarriage
Agents are now allowed to remarry, and the cost of divorcing is that agents
have to remain single for at least one period. The threshold values for love can now
be solved by backward induction starting at an individual’s final period of life. Let,
Vn,g,k and Vn,g,k,k∗ denote the value of a single, age n, type k, and gender g agent,
and married, age n, type {k, k∗} couple, respectively. The labor time allocation
decision remains intratemporal, and labor choices and intratemporal utilities are as
above in the three period model. The value of being single and married at each age
n are,




sge + (1− sge)











where sgk∗sge+(1−sge) is the probability of meeting a type k
∗ of the opposite sex, and









where d = min {bn+1,g,k,k∗ − bg, bn+1,g∗,k,k∗ − bg∗} under consent divorce laws and
d = max {bn+1,g,k,k∗ − bg, bn+1,g∗,k,k∗ − bg∗} under unilateral divorce laws. The
threshold for love is,
bg,k,k∗ = Vn,g,k − V̂n,g,k,k∗ , (2.36)









fraction of educated men and women is,
ge = P (κg ≤ β (V1,g,e − V1,g,u))}, (2.37)
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assuming that agents do not consume when young and can spread the cost of edu-
cation across their lifetime.
Lastly, the marriage and divorce rates for a given generation, assuming that


















where ck,k∗ is the proportion of married agents of type {k, k∗}.
2.5.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the United States in 2000 and then simulated,
the parameters to be determined are
{β, α, γs, γc, κl, κu, bl, bu, εl, εu} .
To avoid widowed agents and individuals that have not made their education deci-
sions yet, only individuals aged 25 to 54 are considered. The number of periods N is
set to six and each period is five years long. Following Greenwood and Guner (2004),
the annual discount factor is set to 0.96, which yields β = 0.965. The elasticity of
substitution between market goods and home production has previously been esti-
mated to range between 1.8 and 2.3 (see Aguiar and Hurst, 2006; Rupert et al., 1995;
McGrattan et al., 1997; Chang and Schorfheide, 2003), implying .4444 < α < .5652.
Restricting α to lie between these boundaries, the parameters {α, γc, γs} are cali-
brated to match the total time allocated to the labor market by married couples ,
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the time spend working by married women, and the time spent working by single
women, which were about about 65.1, 25.6, and 30.5 hours per week, respectively,
in the 2000 CPS survey.
The cost of education determines the fraction of educated women and men.
The model as-is, is unable to match the education gap, and would predict men
to obtain more education than women. In the current model, the lifetime utility
of uneducated women is “too high.” We have ignored any fertility choice in this
model. However, uneducated women have, on average, more children than educated
women regardless of their marital status (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Children by Marital Status 1950 to 2007 (Average)
Marital Status Uneducated Educated Ratio
Married 1.66 1.47 1.13
Never Married/Single .66 .22 3.03
Separated/Divorced 1.33 1.00 1.32
The optimal solution is to introduce a fertility choice. The focus of this
study is not explaining fertility choices or the origins of the education gap per se,
but rather to explore the link between education and divorce. Thus, the introduction
of endogenous fertility is left for future research. There are two other possibilities
to match the education gap.
1. The cost of education differs between men and women: letting the lower bound
be zero, κl,f = κl,m = 0, and calibrating κu,g to match the fraction of gender
g with some college education aged 25 to 30, which is about 61 percent for
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women and 55 percent for men in the 2000 CPS survey.
2. Alternatively, we could assume that women can only spend a fraction of their
total time working, ˆ̀f,k < 1, since they have to devote the remainder of their
time to raising their children. The fraction of time spend at home is then
ˆ̀
f,knf,k or ˆ̀f,knf,k,k∗ and the intratemporal utilities are ˆ̀f,kUf,k and ˆ̀f,kUk,k∗
for single and married agents respectively. As only the difference Vg,e − Vg,u
matters, we can set ˆ̀f,e = 1, κl = 0 and calibrate ˆ̀f,u to match the fraction of
educated women in 2000 and κu to match the fraction of educated men.
The results reported use the second alternative, however, both choices produce fairly
similar results on all the model dimensions.
The distribution of the initial love draw is determined by the marriage rate
in 2000, which is about 46.5 marriages per 1,000 unmarried women. Since there is
only one data target and two parameters, we set bu = 0 and bl to match the 2000
marriage rate. The model target is divided by five to account for each five-year
period in the model.
The distribution of the love shock is determined by the divorce rate in 2000,
which is about 19 divorces per 1,000 married couples. We assume that love shocks
have mean zero, i.e. εl = −εu, and εu, is set, as with the marriage rate, to match
the divorce rate in 2000.
To calibrate the model both 1950 and 2000 are assumed to be steady states,
agents have perfect foresight regarding wages and divorce law changes, and divorce
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laws switch from consent to unilateral in 1970 (the first states to adopt unilateral
divorce laws did so in 1968 (see for example Friedberg, 1998)).
Table 2.3 summarizes the chosen data targets, data moments and parameter
values.
Table 2.3: Moments and Parameter Estimates
Moment 2000 Data Model Parameter






Married Women’s Labor Hours 25.6 25.8
Single Women’s Labor Hours 30.5 30.5
Fraction of Educated Women 0.61 0.615 ˆ̀f,u = 0.8232
Fraction of Educated Men 0.55 0.55 κu = 1.5983
Marriage Rate 0.0465 0.0464 bl = −0.5963
Divorce Rate 0.019 0.019 εu = −εl = 0.3213
Wages are taken from the 2000 CPS survey (see Table 2.1 of Section 2.2).
To simulate the baseline model, with the parameter estimates from Table 2.3, an
assumption on the wage growth rate has to be made. As mentioned in Section 2.2,
it is evident that women’s wages caught up with men’s wages for all education lev-
els. However, simply feeding a constant wage growth rate into the model assumes
that household productivity did not grow since 1950. Ngai and Pissarides (2005), in
their study on the trend of hours worked since 1930, assume that while household
productivity did grow, it did so at an annual 0.004 percent less than the productiv-
ity in the service sector. Having no good estimates on the household productivity
parameter, three different real wage growth rates are tested (see Table 2.4). Taking
uneducated men’s wages as the base, Scenario (1) assumes no home productivity
growth, Scenario (2) assumes that uneducated men’s wages grew at only 50 percent
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of the CAGR, and Scenario (3) assumes that wages did not grow at all. The pa-
rameters reported in Table 2.3 are from calibrating Scenario (1). Scenario (1), (2),
and (3) parameter estimates differ by only a few thousandths of a decimal points,
for example α = {0.4773, 0.4759, 0.4748}.
Table 2.4: CAGR of Wages Adjusted for Home Productivity Growth
Education Group Scenario (1) Scenario (2) Scenario (3)
Male with Some College 0.82 0.47 0.12
Male with No College 0.70 0.35 0
Female with Some College 1.13 0.78 0.43
Female with No College 0.87 0.52 0.17
2.6 Main Results
The results presented in this section show that the mechanism highlighted
in this study does well in matching the evolution of divorce rates in the United
States. Moreover, it is able to generate up to 75 percent of the observed rise in
female education in the United States. On other dimensions the framework is also
able to replicated the United States’ average weekly hours worked data and the level
of assortive matching in education, but fails to match the fall in marriage rates.
2.6.1 Divorce and Education
Figure 2.4 and 2.5 show the simulated divorce rates and education trends.
Scenario (1) does better in replicating the college attendance trend, while Scenario
(3) does better in replicating the divorce rate trend. More specifically, with the
highest real wage growth (Scenario (1)) the divorce rate is overestimated in 1950 and
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immediately after the divorce law switch in 1975. The model is unable to generate
the precise pattern of the divorce rate from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, since,
in the United States, states introduced unilateral divorce laws from 1968 to 1984.
Introducing “states” in the model and allowing for a slow transition from consent
to unilateral divorce across the entire population would result in a transition more
similar to the one observed in the data. Taking this issue aside, the model does well
in replicating the evolution of divorce rates in the United States.
In explaining the fraction of individuals with some college education, the
model generates a reversal in the education gap, which coincides with the change in
divorce laws in 1970. In the data, the reversal of the education gap is not observed
until the mid-1980s. Similar to the observation on divorce rates, a slow introduction
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Data Women Data Men Scenario (1) Women Scenario (1) Men
Scenario (2) Women Scenario (2) Men Scenario (3) Women Scenario (3) Men
of unilateral divorce laws shifts the date of the education reversal. However, the
model is unlikely to replicate the precise date of the education reversal, even with
the introduction of “states.” To summarize the results on the education trends, the
increase in individuals with some college education in the United States, which is
replicated in the model is reported in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Percent Explained of the Rise in Education
Model Gender (SC) (1) (2) (3)
Base Model Male 54.42 41.16 27.90Female 75.50 69.51 65.22
Constant Wages Male 20.15 19.95 19.86Female 37.14 36.93 36.84
Consent Divorce Male 37.18 23.19 9.03Female 43.47 36.03 29.42
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As a comparison, Table 2.5 also reports the findings of two experiments, (1) only
divorce laws are allowed to change, i.e. wages are held constant at the 2000 level
throughout the whole time period, and (2) only wages are allowed to change, while
consent divorce laws prevail throughout the whole period. Depending on the real
wage growth rate, the model is able to explain anywhere from 65 to 76 percent of
the rise in the fraction of women with some college education observed in the United
States. In contrast, the base model does not preform as well in explaining the rise
in male education, explaining anywhere from 28 to 54 percent. Eliminating the
incentives of a rising college wage premium on attending college leads the model to
generate roughly a 37 percent of the rise in education for women and 20 percent for
men. While eliminating the added divorce risk of unilateral divorce laws generates a
rise in the proportion of educated women from 30 to 43 percent and 9 to 37 percent
for men. Given the nature of this last experiment, it is not surprising that the
results are highly dependent on the “real” wage growth rate. The findings reported
in Table 2.5 are consistent with the hypothesis that women are more exposed to
the negative effects of increased divorce risks, but also experienced a faster rise in
the returns to education than men. As we noted in Section 2.2, educated women’s
wages grew 0.31 percent annually faster than educated men’s, compared to a 0.17
percent growth difference for uneducated individuals.
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2.6.2 Hours Worked, Marriage, and Matching
On other dimensions, the model is able to replicate most of the change in
weekly hours worked (see Table 2.6).3
Table 2.6: Average Weekly Hours Worked by Gender and Marital Status
Data (1) (2) (3)
Group 1950 2000 1950 2000 1950 2000 1950 2000
Married Men 40.93 40.51 44.55 39.00 44.51 39.00 44.48 39.00
Single Men 30.09 33.48 27.11 31.03 28.85 30.97 30.66 31.03
Married Women 10.01 25.57 10.92 25.83 13.18 25.85 16.31 25.87
Single Women 27.17 30.45 26.41 30.54 27.84 30.47 29.33 30.50
The model captures the overall rise in women’s average weekly hours worked, almost
matching it one-to-one in Scenario (1), but underestimating it by 40 percent in
Scenario (3). It also matches, in all scenarios, the change in single women’s weekly
hours worked. However, the model underestimates the weekly hours worked for
single men by about 2 hours and generates a fall in weekly hours worked for married
men, which is inconsistent at the intensive margin. A fall in labor force participation
for married men would only be consistent at the extensive margin (see Figure 1.11
in Chapter 1).
Figure 2.6 illustrates the matching in education levels, that is the fraction of
couples with equal educational attainment, the fraction of couples where men have
some college education while women do not, and vice versa. All wage growth sce-
3Average weekly hours measure the rise in the intensive margin in labor force participation.
Thus, averages include all individuals of the civilian population aged 25 to 54, including individuals
with zero hours worked per week.
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Data Same Education Data Male Higher Education Data Female Higher Education
Scenario (1) Same Education Scenario (1) Male Higher Education Scenario (1) Female Higher Education
Scenario (2) Same Education Scenario (2) Male Higher Education Scenario (2) Female Higher Education
Scenario (3) Same Education Scenario (3) Male Higher Education Scenario (3) Female Higher Education
narios produce similar matching results, and do fairly well in matching the United
States data, except for the early periods, where the model overestimates the frac-
tion of couples with more educated males.4 Moreover, the model produces findings
consistent with Chiappori et al. (2006).
Lastly, the model fails in predicting the evolution of marriage rates in the
economy. While, the framework does generate a downward trend starting in 1965,
it is unable to match the 1950 marriage rate or the slope of the downward trend.
This is where the omission of fertility is likely to play the biggest role. If we allowed
men and women to derive pleasure from having children, men would likely be more
4The matching of couples in the United States 1950 Census was not possible.
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willing to enter into a marriage in 1950, given that women would stay at home
and birth more children. Over time, as women enter the labor market and fertility
declines, the utility from marriage should decline as well, leading to a fall in the
marriage rates.
2.7 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to assess how much of the observed United
States’ divorce rate evolution and the female educational investment trend can be
explained by a model that allows for an interdependent relationship between divorce
and education. This simple overlapping generations model is able to explain a large
fraction of the rise in the proportion of educated women. Even after eliminating any
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rise in the returns to education, a divorce law change to unilateral divorce is able
to explain about 37 percent of the observed rise in female educational investment.
As expected, the model does less well in predicting the rise in male educational
investment, explaining only 20 percent of the data if wages are held constant and
between 28 to 54 percent when including the rise in the college wage premium. In
contrast, the base model is able to explain between 65 to 75 percent, depending
on the “real” growth rate of wages, of the United States’ rise in the fraction of
women with some college education. Moreover, the model does well in replicating
the evolution of divorce rates in the United States from 1950 to 2000.
For robustness the model is also compared to the the evolution of weekly
hours worked, the level of assortive matching on education in marriage, and the
evolution of the marriage rate in the United States. While the model preforms
well on the first two dimensions, it does poorly in matching the evolution of the
marriage rate. This is most likely due to the omission of fertility and children
in marriage. In this study only utility from love and public goods consumption
is derived in marriage. An additional utility derived from having children would
certainly increase the willingness of males to marry.
Lastly, this model has ignored the potential of insuring against divorce risks
by increasing one’s labor force participation in the years prior to a divorce to accumu-
late work experience (see Johnson and Skinner, 1986; Montalto, 1994). Introducing
work experience into the model will dampen the rise in educational attainment due
to increased divorce risks and should, therefore, be incorporated into future research.
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Chapter 3
Marriage, Divorce and Savings: Don’t Let An
Economist Choose Your Spouse
This chapter considers the implications of marital uncertainty on aggregate
household savings behavior. To this end an infinite horizon model with perpetual
youth that features uncertainty over marriage quality is developed. Similarly to
Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull (1997), I test how much of the fall in the savings rate from
the 1960s to the 1980s can be explained by the changing United States demographic
composition, specifically the rise in divorce rates and the fall in marriage rates. It
is assumed that these demographic changes are driven primarily by the shrinking
gender wage gap and the relaxation of divorce-laws.
3.1 Introduction
“. . . when it comes to building wealth or avoiding poverty, a stable marriage
may be your most important asset.” - Waite and Gallagher (pg. 123, 2000)
The national savings rate has dropped drastically from 8 percent in mid-
century to 2 percent in 1980 (see Bosworth et al., 1991). Moreover, according to
estimates by Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull (1997) from the Consumer Expenditure Sur-
veys (CES) (1960-1961, 1972-1973 and 1984-1990) the household savings rate out of
disposable income fell from 8.95 to 4.17 percent from the 1960s to the 1980s. Dur-
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ing this same time period the composition of households underwent drastic changes.
While there were fewer married households in the 1980s, there where also consid-
erable more divorces (see Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2). More specifically, the divorce
rate per 1,000 married women doubled from the 1960s to the 1980s, by rising from
10 to 20 percent, and the marriage rate experienced a linear continuous downward
trend. Part of this sharp rise in divorce rates can be attributed to the relaxation
of divorce laws in the 1970s (see Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006), which allowed
for unilateral divorce. With this law it became possible to petition for a divorce
without the consent of the spouse. Moreover, since the mid-1970s the wage gap
and employment difference between men and women started to close (see Figure
1.1 in Chapter 1) potentially contributing to part of the marital changes. In this
study I present microeconomic evidence supporting significant differences in house-
hold savings behavior by martial status and marital “bliss”, and develop a partial
equilibrium model to determine the impact of the liberalization of divorce laws and
rising female wages on the aggregate savings rate.
In analyzing the effects of demographic changes on household savings rates
the focus has mainly been on the aging population (see for example Auerbach et al.,
1989; Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1992). Generally, these results show the aging popula-
tion, ceteris paribus, unable to explain the sharp drop in saving rates.1 However the
importance of household formation and dissolution on savings and wealth accumu-
lation has been pointed out by Quadrini and Ŕıos-Rull (1997). The authors suggest
1For a short survey on studies related to savings behavior and wealth inequality see DeNardi
(2002).
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that in order to obtain results more closely matching the main features, especially
in the lower quintiles of the U.S. wealth distribution, models should incorporate the
potential risks associated with marital status. They argue that since changes in mar-
ital status are uninsurable and not directly reflected in individuals’ earnings data,
theses shocks could be important factors when characterizing household wealth in
the bottom quintiles, especially for young to middle-aged individuals.
Most closely related to this study is the research conducted by Cubbedu
and Ŕıos-Rull (2002). The authors in their paper “Families as Shocks” develop a
simple model where agents face uninsurable shocks to marital status over the life
cycle. The main goal is to point out the importance of including marital status
differences in models of macroeconomics. The study simulates various exogenous
marital shock processes and subsequently determines optimal savings patterns. The
authors find that uninsurable martial risk is “just as important” as uninsurable
earnings uncertainty in determining savings patterns and the wealth distribution
over the life cycle, thus, concluding that neglecting marital status in macroeconomic
models can have a significant impact. However, the study neglects the importance
of an endogenous marriage process, allowing agents no autonomy in choosing whom
to marry, and at what point in time to divorce or marry. Guner and Knowles
(2004) are, to my knowledge, the first to develop a model of savings and endogenous
marriage decisions. The authors develop an overlapping generation model that
relates the wealth of older households to their earlier decisions about work, marriage
and divorce. Agents make decisions over savings and marriage in a three period set-
up. The authors find that wealth differences across marital statuses are mainly
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a result of the following two facts: (1) differences in savings rates, and (2) high
income people are more likely to have stable marriages. While I model marriage
and divorce in a similar way, by using the richer marriage match quality evolution
from Greenwood and Guner (2004), the focus in this study is on the impact of
the closing wage gap and changes in divorce laws on the aggregate savings rate.
Therefore, the central point of this chapter is to test the question first postulated
by Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull (1997), who study whether the drastic rise in divorce
rates and illegitimacy from the 1960s to late 1980s can explain the drop in aggregate
savings rate. While the authors concluded divorce and illegitimacy only to have a
minor impact on aggregated savings, the study neglects the potential importance of
endogenizing the marriage process, and model divorce uncertainty by an exogenous
shock process.
Why do people save? Most current wealth inequality and savings models
use one of the following reasons to model household savings desires (listed in no
particular order of importance):
• Precautionary savings. Individuals save due to uncertainty over labor earn-
ings and the inability to insure against adverse events (incomplete markets).
However, savings due to precautionary reasons found in recent studies are too
small to explain U.S. savings patterns. Aiyagari (1994) finds precautionary
savings to add around 3 percent.
• Retirement funds. Franco Modigliani developed the “life-cycle” model. In-
dividuals save during their peak years of earnings in order to maintain con-
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sumption levels during retirement. However, the life-cycle principal in its most
simple form does poorly in predicting savings patterns. Kotlikoff and Summers
(1981) show that as much as 80 percent of current U.S. wealth is inherited and
therefore conclude that the life-cycle component of aggregate U.S. savings is
very small.
• Bequests. The dynastic model developed by Becker (1974) and Barro (1974),
assumes wealth is accumulated for bequest purposes; i.e. individuals care about
the welfare of their offspring and, therefore, save. However, the basic dynastic
model does poorly in predicting wealth concentration. Aiyagari (1994) can
only produce 4 percent of total wealth for the top 1 percent of the population
compared to a 28 percent of total wealth in U.S. data.
Contrary, to the above three theories households’ savings decisions in this study
are driven by marital uncertainty. Marital uncertainty, is the uncertainty over a
marriage match quality and the uncertainty of meeting a potential spouse. Why
could it help explain the fall in aggregate savings? The model specified in this study
plays on the following interactions of household structure and savings:
1. Married households have, on average, more disposable income than single
households, through dual-earners and economies of scales, allowing them to
save a greater fraction of their income;
2. Divorce has an evident negative impact on household finances, a multi-person
household splits, some wealth is lost in the process, the remainder is divided
and spouses lose the economies of scale in maintaining their home;
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3. Rational households prepare for the probability of a divorce by changing their
consumption and savings behavior. High earning members of a household that
foresee/expect a divorce are less likely to save due to divorce costs and potential
asset redistribution, spousal support, etc. while, low earning members or
households where both spouses have similar earnings, save more as economies
of scales are lost upon divorce; and
4. Single agents might save in order to differentiate themselves from other poten-
tial spouses in the marriage market. A lower marriage rate and higher divorce
rate will likely dissipate this effect, as the benefits of marriage fall.
Therefore, an economy with a high fraction of married households and low divorce
rate, should, in general, have a higher aggregate savings rate. Changes in divorce
laws, that is an increase in marital uncertainty, and falling number of married house-
holds can greatly affect the aggregate savings rate.
The model developed in this chapter builds on the framework of Guner
and Knowles (2004) and Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull (1997). While this study expands
directly on the work done by Guner and Knowles, it contrasts Cubeddu and Ŕıos-
Rull by internalizing marriage decisions. I depart form previous studies that include
marriage decisions by following Aiyagari’s infinite horizon model.2 The infinite
horizon model is preferable as it simplifies the calibration, lowering the parameters to
2An exception in this stream of literature is the study by Regalia and Ŕıos-Rull (1999) that uses
an infinite horizon model to study the increase in single households from the 1970s to the 1990s,
as well as Greenwood and Guner (2004) who study the effect of falling household goods prices on
female labor supply, marriage and divorce.
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be specified and matched over the life-cycle, therefore, reducing the computational
time burden. In order to focus solely on the effects of marriage and divorce on
savings, I abstract from productivity shocks following Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull work.
However, contrary to this later study which studies a finite horizon model with
evolving wage profiles over the life-cycle, households will not be saving for life-cycle
purposes in this chapter, i.e. that is agents will only save due to marital uncertainty.
It should be stressed that this chapter only focuses on the effects of house-
holds’ decisions of marriage and divorce on savings pattern and the resulting aggre-
gate savings and wealth distribution. This is certainly a restrictive set-up given the
results of other research in the area of wealth inequality and savings. In general,
we expect earnings uncertainty, entrepreneurship, bequest motives, social security,
fertility, etc. to have an important impact on savings and wealth inequality. How-
ever, the focus in this study is to isolate the effects of changing divorce laws and the
shrinking wage gap on savings behavior and wealth inequality. I test how much ag-
gregate savings is generated in a standard model such as Aiyagari’s infinite horizon
model of precautionary savings with endogenous martial uncertainty. The compu-
tational results indicate marriage and divorce risks to be an important factor in
predicting aggregate savings. More specifically, endogenizing marriage and divorce
leads to the following differences in savings behavior and wealth inequality: (1)
lower divorce risk increase aggregate savings by about 13 percent alone. While, the
combined effect of lower divorce risks and higher marriage rates is about 40 percent.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides
U.S. facts on aggregate savings and marital distress on household savings behavior
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relevant to this study; Section 3.3 develops a model where agents differ in gender,
wages, marriage match quality and divorce laws change in the 1970s; Section 3.4
provides details on the calibration; Section 3.5 compares the resulting savings rates
in the 1960s and 1980s, as well as cross-sectional household savings behavior; lastly,
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 U.S. Facts
The exercise focuses on the dramatic fall of the US aggregate savings rate
over time. Estimates for aggregate household savings rate vary across studies, how-
ever, a drastic fall in savings is undisputed. I use the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) since it is the only study with considerable household wealth information to
compute specific savings rates by three demographic groups: married households,
single men and single women. The SCF reinterviewed household in 1963 from its
1962 survey, and again in 1986 from its 1983 survey.3 Contrary the CES, which
collects household consumption and income over a year, the SCF obtains detailed
household wealth holdings. Therefore, rather than, as in Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull
(1997), estimating savings as the difference between income and consumption, I es-
timate savings by the first difference of net worth across two years. Bosworth et al.
(1991) estimate aggregate savings using both these surveys and find comparable
estimates with aggregate savings rate falling by 4.3 percent in the 1972/1973 to
1882/1985 CES surveys and 4.5 percent in the 1962/1963 to 1983/1986 SCF sur-
3Note that in the 1960s the surveys were called the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of
Consumers and the 1963 Survey of Changes in Family Finances, but in this study are referred to
as SCF.
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veys. Since, the model abstracts from many income sources, in computing savings
and wealth distribution estimates I restrict the sample as follows: (1) households
headed by a person under the age of 25 in 1962 and 1983 or over the age of 64 are
eliminated to capture only the working population; (2) households with savings or
borrowings greater than reported income plus capital gains and gifts are eliminated;
and (3) all households with wealth from own businesses exceeding 10 percent of total
wealth in the base year are deleted. Therefore, leaving a sample of 1,077 and 1,459
households in the 1960s and 1980s, respectively. Savings are defined as the differ-
ence in net worth less own-home value appreciation between the two survey years.4
In computing aggregate savings rate I use the standard specification of Bosworth
et al. (1991), where the aggregate savings rate at time t is determined by the sum









where αj,t is the proportion of group j at time t and
∑
j αj,t = 1,
yj,t
Yt
is the ratio of
average income of group j to total average income Yt at time t, and sj,t is the group’s
average savings rate. Aggregate savings fall from 17.18 to 9.37 percent, or by about
83 percent somewhat lower than Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull (1997) 115 percent CES
estimates. However, the estimate is in line with estimates by Bosworth et al. (1991)
given my more restricted sample. The authors obtain a slightly lower 1960s estimate
of 14 percent mainly due to the addition of people above the age of 65. Table 3.1
4Since net worth estimates in 1983 and 1986 are provided I use these measures and follow
Projector (1968) in computing net worth and savings for the 1962/1963 survey.
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summarizes the specific components of the aggregate savings formula for the three
groups in the 1960s and 1980s.
Table 3.1: Components of Aggregate Savings (SCF)
Married Single Men Single Women
1960s 1980s 1960s 1980s 1960s 1980s
Fraction of Population αj 77.68 64.58 7.05 12.69 15.27 22.74
Relative income share yj,tYt 1.12 1.15 0.71 0.86 0.52 0.65
Savings rate sj,t 17.81 10.39 13.60 5.92 12.44 6.78
It is evident that most of the drop in savings is driven by a fall in the savings rate
of each specific group, while the composition of the population, i.e. the fall in the
fraction of married households only plays a smaller role. Aggregate savings in 1980
would have been one percentage point higher with the population structure of the
1960s, that is αj stayed at the 1960s value. However, the drop in savings within each
group could be partially driven by the fear of greater divorce rates and the lower in-
centive for single agents to attract a “better” spouse. Microeconomic studies provide
some estimates on the effects of marital instability on savings. For example, Brenner
et al. (1992) estimate that the introduction of unilateral-divorce would have lowered
the savings rate by 1.3 percent after three years in the United States (their model
has a two year lag structure) - according to the authors, a sizable fall in aggregate
savings. Observing, in addition, a sharp rise in female labor force participation, the
authors conclude that these divorce law changes changed the importance of savings
in financial and physical assets toward investing in labor force participation and ed-
ucation. Similarly, Finke and Pierce (2006) study whether households that divorce
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within a 5 year time span from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1994 to
1999 save more or less in anticipation of the impending divorce. The authors inves-
tigate whether the standard precautionary savings theory, that is households save
more when future income is increasingly uncertain applies to marital uncertainty for
all types of wage earner. It seems to only apply for spouses with similar earnings,
that is a “divorcing” household, where each spouse contributes about 40 to 60 per-
cent of total earnings, does save statistically significant more than a non-divorcing
household with 40-60 earners. However, divorcing households with one high wage
spouse have statistically significant lower wealth than non-divorcing households of
the same type. More specifically, spouses that contributed 21 to 40 percent held
$62, 000 compared to $99, 000 for non-divorcing households in wealth. Spouses that
contributed 40 to 60 percent held almost $41, 000 more in assets than non-divorcing
households. The variance in 61 to 90 percent contributers was large and wealth
holding comparison inconclusive. And lastly, the highest contributers, that is 90
percent and above, held on average $28, 000 less in wealth than comparable married
households. Therefore, in households with unequal earnings contributions precau-
tionary savings motives are replaced by the possible asset and income redistribution
upon divorce, e.g. through spousal and child support.
Given, the changes in savings behavior over time by households, a driving
force that could have affected the population structure as well as the savings behavior
by the three groups must have existed. What caused this sharp rise in divorce
rates and the steady fall in marriages is heavily debated. Some argue that the
liberalization of divorce laws, with the introduction of no-fault unilateral divorce
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starting in the late 1960s, had a considerable impact on divorce rates, e.g. Friedberg
(1998) argues that divorce rates would have been 6 percent lower without unilateral
divorce laws and the introduction of the law can account for 17 percent of the overall
increase from 1968 to 1988. Others argue that the effect was less important, but
nonetheless still significant. For example Wolfers (2006) finds a small and transitory
rise in divorce for states that passed unilateral divorce laws, which fades within a
decade. Since changes in divorce laws seem to explain only part of the rising divorce
and falling marriage rates, I postulate that the drastic change of female wages and
labor force participation also contributed to the changing marital environment (see
also Chapter 2). In support of this theory Greenwood and Guner (2004) argue
for the rise in female employment to be a substantial driving force in the falling
marriage and increased divorce rates. Why female employment rose is another
debate. Possible explanations are: (1) falling cost of household appliances (see
Greenwood and Guner, 2004, and references therein) ; (2) the falling gender wage
gap (see Jones et al., 2003); and (3) the rising returns to experience for women
(see Olivetti, 2006). Since, it is unfeasible to add all these effects into the model,
the closing wage gap (see Figure 2.2) and the introduction of no-fault unilateral
divorce laws in the 1970s, are taken as the main driving forces in lowering marriage
and increasing divorce rates. In summary, unilateral divorce and increased wages
changes bargaining within a marriage by improving a spouses outside options. These
two events/trends lead to a fall in the proportion of married households and a rise
in divorces.
Lastly, Dı́az-Gimnez et al. (1997); Budria et al. (2002) report the main facts
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on earnings, income and wealth inequality in the U.S. economy. To this purpose
the authors use data from the 1992 and 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),
respectively. Both papers conclude that households of different marital status have
very different earnings, income, and wealth profiles. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 picture the
distribution of each demographic group by earnings and wealth quintiles. Married
households are evenly distributed between the quintiles, in both earnings and wealth,
with a slightly greater concentration in the middle than the tails. Contrary, single
women have a high concentration in the lowest wealth quintile and are more evenly
distributed over the remaining, while their earnings distribution is highly skewed
toward lower quintiles. Similarly, there is again a higher proportion of men in the
lowest wealth quintile, but on average men do better than women, and men’s earn-
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Married Single Male Single Female
ings distribution is reverse to women’s, that is skewed toward the higher earnings
quintiles. Moreover, Dı́az-Gimnez et al. (1997) and Budria et al. (2002) find that
married households have substantially higher earnings and income, while owning
substantially more per capita wealth than single households.5 Guner and Knowles
(2004), when analyzing the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), find that single
men are wealthiest, while single women are poorest with $190, 055 versus $65, 425
average wealth. In addition, married couples hold on average $134, 673 per capita
wealth, while divorced agents hold $129, 239 and $84, 005 for men and women, re-
spectively. It is evident that married households, even when accounting for the
5Results hold when adjusting for adult members in the household.
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double income source, tend to be better off then single households. Moreover, Lup-
ton and Smith (1999) find that divorced households have about 25 to 30 percent of
the median net wealth of married households.
3.3 The Model
The model of precautionary savings by Aiyagari (1994) is modified to in-
clude precautionary savings due to marital uncertainty rather than labor uncer-
tainty. Agents differ by gender, wealth holdings, ability, and marital status, which
is determined endogenously through marriage and divorce decisions.6 Moreover,
the model is adjusted to include a perpetual youth feature to guarantee a steady
fraction of single agents.
3.3.1 The Environment
Let the economy be populated by a large number of agents who differ by:
• Gender: g ∈ {f,m}, females and males, respectively;
• Marital status: ms ∈ ms = {s, c}, where s stands for single and c for married
(coupled), respectively;
• Inherited (initial) wealth, which is randomly distributed;
6Results for a model with exogenous marriage uncertainty are also presented. In this scenario
the marriage decision is substituted by a two-state Markov process with probability ξij = p(ms
′ =
msj |ms = msi), where i, j = s, c stands for single and “coupled” (married), respectively. Also, note,
that for simplicity and without loss of generality a direct utility from the marriage is omitted in
this case. The omission would only have an impact in welfare calculations, which are not computed
in this chapter.
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• By ability ε, which determines an agents efficient wage.
Agents derive utility from marriage γ and consumption c > 0. Agents also face a
probability of death 0 < δ < 1, each period, and might therefore widow or leave
accidental bequest. Lastly, agents cannot borrow. This is not important for the
qualitative results of this chapter, however, it eases the computational burden.7
3.3.1.1 Preferences
Spouses are restricted to consume the same amount, but only care about
own consumption. Following Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull (1997) I take into account
household size in consumption calculations, such that $1 of expenditure buys $ 1ηms
of consumption for each agent. For single households ηs = 1, while in married
households 2 > ηc > 1. This feature captures the economies of scale, due to public







Married agents derive an additional utility from marriage, defined by match quality
γ, which implies a one period utility for each spouse of
uc(c) + γ, (3.3)
where γ is the utility/disutility from being married. Single agents draw a common
γ upon meeting. Following Greenwood and Guner (2004) γ is normally distributed
and herein denoted by S(γ),
γ ∼ N (µs, σ2s). (3.4)
7In quantitative terms, allowing for borrowing may lower equilibrium aggregate savings rates.
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For married couples γ evolves according to the autoregressive progress,
γ′ = (1− ρ)µc + ργ + σc
√
1− ρ2ξ, ξ ∼ N (0, 1), (3.5)
where γ′ is the next periods utility, given this period the marriage utility is γ. This
implies that γ′|γ is normally distributed, with the distribution denoted by P (γ′|γ),
γ′|γ ∼ N ((1− ρ)µc + ργ, σ2c (1− ρ2)). (3.6)
3.3.1.2 Endowment and Factor Prices
The study solves the partial equilibrium, where wages and interest rates are
set exogenously. As mentioned previously agents supply labor inelastically and only
differ by their innate ability. The wage, wg,t, as well as the set of ability εg, which
differ for men and women, are determined from the data.8 Consequently, an agent
receives each period earnings of εgwg,t. The gender wage gap is captured by the fact
that wm,t > wf,t.
3.3.1.3 Timing
The timing of events of one year is as follows:
1. Agents begin the period as either married or single (includes divorcees) with
asset level a ∈ A;
2. The marriage market opens:
8Source: 1962-1999 Current Population Survey Integrated Public Use Micro-data Samples
(IPUMS-CPS, King et al., 2004). See the following section for further details on the calibration.
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(a) If an agent is single, he/she goes to the marriage market. A meeting
is guaranteed, they observe each others characteristics, i.e. asset hold-
ings and the common match quality γ. With this information as public
knowledge agents decide on whether to accept the marriage. Marriage
only ensues if both parties agree to the match.
(b) If an agent is married, he/she decides on whether to remain married or
divorce. In order to maintain the marriage both spouses must agree.9
However, prior to the 1960s in accordance with the stricter divorce laws
agents have to agree on divorcing. If agents divorce, they remain single
for the current period. In the event of a divorce assets are split, with
some assets being destroyed due to divorce costs (defined in detail in the
maximization problem).
3. Savings and consumption decisions: once all marriage and divorce decisions
have taken place agents decide on savings and consumption.
4. Agents are born and die, and the marriage quality of married couples updates.
5. The period concludes.
From the above set-up it is evident that agents will differ in their marital
status, earnings, asset holdings and gender. The next paragraphs outline the choices
of each agent type.
9Utility is not transferable and, therefore, remaining married cannot be negotiated.
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3.3.2 Maximization Problem
All agents decide whether to marry or divorce and how much to save. Let
Vs,g(a, ε), be the value function of a single agent of gender g, who holds a wealth
and has the innate ability ε. Similarly, let Vc,g(â, ε, εg∗, γ) be the value functions
for a married agent of gender g, who is married to a spouse (subscript g∗), with
marriage match quality γ and assets â. The marriage and divorce decisions are then
as follows:
• A single agent would marry the agent he/she meets for the set of match qual-
ities,
Gs,g = {γ : Vc,g(â, ε, εg∗, γ) ≥ Vs,g(a, ε)}; and (3.7)
• A married agent would like to remain married for the set of match qualities,
Gc,g = {γ : Vc,g(â, ε, εg∗, γ) ≥ Vs,g(αga, ε)}, (3.8)
where αg is the proportion of assets distributed to the spouse of sex g upon
divorce.
Note, that there is no guarantee that the agent gets/remains married if a match
quality from the given sets is drawn, as the decision also depends on the spouse.
To model the change in divorce laws to unilateral-divorce, agents prior to the 1960s
have to agree on divorcing, but after the late 1960s/early 1970s, each spouse can
unilaterally decide on divorcing, therefore, increasing the divorce risk.
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3.3.2.1 Single Agent Problem
The single agent’s problem is complicated by the fact that the agent has to
be aware of the distribution of single agents in the economy. The fraction of single
agents (normalized to one) of opposite sex with assets ag∗ and ability ε or state









Vs,g(a′, ε)dS(γ′) + · · ·∫ ∞
max(γ̄,γ̄g∗)




c = (1 + r)a+ wgε− a′, (3.10)
where “primes” represent next period variables. Married assets are â′ = a′+ a′g∗, as
asset holdings are combined after marriage. The cut-off values for marriage γ̄ and
γ̄g∗ are determined by γ that makes the inequality in the set Gs,g hold with equality.
As both agents must agree on the marriage, the higher cut-off value ultimately
determines the marriage choice.
3.3.2.2 Married Agent Problem
A married household chooses asset holdings for the next period in unison.
This problem can be solved in various ways. The literature has traditionally focused
on solving a weighted maximization problem, which leads to the Pareto optimal
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solution. A married household solves,
max
a′
uc(c) + β(1− δ)2
{∫ max(γ̄m,γ̄f )
−∞
νmVs,m(αma′, ε) + νfVs,f (αfa′, ε)dP (γ′|γ) + · · ·∫ ∞
max(γ̄m,γ̄f )
νmVc,m(a′, εf , εm, γ′) + νfVc,f (a′, εf , εm, γ′)dP (γ′|γ)
}
+ · · · (3.11)
β(1− δ)δ
{
νmVs,m(a′, ε) + νfVs,f (a′, ε)
}
s.t.
c = (1 + r)a+ wgε+ wg∗εg∗ − a′, (3.12)
where νg are spousal weights and νg + νg∗ = 1. If a couple divorces, agents, by
assumption, remain single for the remainder of the period, while assets are split
according to the proportions αg (determined exogenously). Due to divorce costs
αg + αg∗ ≤ 1 is possible. The last term multiplied by β(1− δ)δ is when one spouse
passing away. Note that, uc(c) and γ are, by assumption, the same for both spouses.
The above specification allows agents to decide on divorce unilaterally. In order to
model the economy prior to the introduction of unilateral-divorce, max(γ̄m, γ̄f ), is
substituted with min(γ̄m, γ̄f ). Once optimal asset holdings ã′ are determined the
value of being married is,
Vc,g(â, ε, εg∗, γ) = uc(c) + γ + β(1− δ)2
{∫ max(γ̄,γ̄g∗)
−∞
Vs,g(αgã, ε)dP (γ′|γ) + · · ·∫ ∞
max(γ̄,γ̄g∗)
Vc,g(ã′, ε, εg∗, γ′)
}
+ β(1− δ)δVs,g(ã, ε). (3.13)
Alternatively, agents could play a Nash bargaining game, where agents’
threat points are the value of being single tomorrow Vs,g(αga′, ε). However, this
is computationally more costly and will be left for future research.
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3.3.3 Partial Equilibrium
As this study solves the partial equilibrium, the only equilibrium piece to
analyze is the matching process of agents each period. However, agents decisions are
influenced by the aggregate state of the economy. More specifically, the distribution
of single agents over wealth levels influences an agent’s decision on marriage, divorce
and savings. This has to be accounted for when analyzing the transition of the
population from one period to the next. Let the population be represented by
the following three distributions, {p(a, εm, εf , γ), sf (a, εf ), sm(a, εm)} of married and
single agents, respectively. Note that
∑
a,ε,εg∗,γ





sg(a, ε) = 1, (3.14)
must hold at all times.
The distributions of married and single agents of gender g are updated in
three consecutive steps. Agents first decide to marry and divorce, where previously
married couples now have an “updated” γ; then agents chose savings for the next
period; and, lastly, some die with “new-born” individuals inheriting the accidental
bequests of the deceased.
Suppose that the distribution of married agents over marriage quality at
the beginning of the period was P−1(a, ε, εg∗, γ−1) for each asset level and ability
combination. This period distribution after the marriage decision is,











where the first term summarizes households with asset holdings a that remain
married, and the second single agents that marry and remain with asset holdings
a = ag + ag∗.
The distribution of single agents is made up of the unmarried/unmatched









dS(γ̂) + · · ·




where the first terms is of “failed” encounters and the second terms are agents
that divorce, where ag = αgac. Updating the savings distribution with the policy
function is straight forward. The fraction of married agents are,
p(a′(a, ε, εg∗, γ), ε, εg∗, γ) = p(a, ε, εg∗, γ), (3.17)
and single agents are,
sg(a′(a, εg), εg) = sg(a, εg). (3.18)
Lastly, couples survive with probability (1 − δ)2. The fraction 2(1 − δ)δ becomes
widowed and to maintain a steady population the difference is born with the asset
levels of the deceased.
3.4 Parameter Calibration
The single agent maximization problem is complicated by the fact that an
agent has to be aware of the distribution of other single agents in the economy. In
order to simplify this problem, I make the reasonable assumption that agents only
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know the asset level of each quintile of the opposite sex, rather then knowing the
full distribution.
Most parameters are taken from other related studies (see Table 3.3 for spe-
cific parameter values). However, the parameters that determine marriage matches,
the initial distribution and the evolution of marriage match quality are chosen by
matching marriage and divorce rates in the United States.10 More specifically, I
match the late 1980s (1984-1990) marriage rate of 58.10 percent per 1,000 unmar-
ried women and the divorce rate of 21.45 percent per 1,000 married women. The
marriage (75.10 percent) and divorce (10.64 percent) rates for the 1960s are only
calibrated in one scenario (see Section 3.5).
When analyzing aggregate savings rates, all agents earn the normalized mean
wage computed from the CPS. Wages are normalized to the male mean wage of
each year. Table 3.2 lists all parameter values used in the simulations. Following






The relative risk aversion parameter σ is set to 1.5 from previous studies (see Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff, 1987; Prescott, 1986; Huggett, 1996; Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull,
1997). The economies of scale parameter ηc is taken from the Organisation for Eco-
10In the exogenous marriage model the Markov transitions to match United States marriage and
divorce rates are (
(s, s′) (s, c′)













for the 1960s and late 1980s, respectively.
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nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) household equivalence scale. The
OECD assigns a value of one to the first household member, 0.7 to each additional
adult and 0.5 to each child, implying ηc = 1.7 for this study.11
Table 3.2: Selected Parameter Values
Household
Discount factor (β) 0.96
Relative risk aversion (σ) 1.5
Household equivalence (ηc) 1.7
Asset split female (αf ) 0.4
Asset split male (αf ) 0.2
Household weight (νf = νm) 0.5
Vital Statistics
Death probability (δ) 0.008
Match quality single (µs;σ2s) -5.65; 7
Match quality married (µc;σ2c ) .462; .75
AR(1) coefficient (ρ) 0.9
Factor Prices
Interest rate (r) .04
Male wage 60s and 80s(w̄m,t) 1; 1
Female wage 60s and 80s(w̄f,t) 0.58; 0.77
Assets are split as in Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull (1997), 40 percent of a couples’
assets are destroyed in the event of a divorce and the remainder is split by αf =
0.4 and αm = 0.2. According to the authors, this unequal asset split accounts
for child/spousal support. Lastly, females and males have equal weights in the
household decision problem, νf = νm = 12 .
11The study abstracts from the issue of fertility, children and dependents.
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3.5 Main Results
The effects of rising divorce rates and falling marriage rates on aggregate
savings are examined. As agents only face marriage uncertainties, all savings incen-
tives are driven by the prospect of a better marriage and the prospect of divorce.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results for various scenarios of the 1960s. The late 1980s
serve as base period, i.e. the aggregate savings rate is normalized to one. All simu-
lations use the parameters calibrated to the 1980s, unless otherwise specified. The
scenarios simulated are,
1. Only wages are adjusted to reflect the higher wage gap in the 1960s;
2. Only the introduction of the unilateral divorce law is modeled;
3. Both points (1) and (2) are combined;
4. Same as point (3), but the initial draw of the marriage quality is raised to
match marriage rates in the 1960s.
The first three scenarios show a poor match for the marriage/divorce rate of the
1960s (75.10 per 1,000 unmarried women and 10.64 per 1,000 married women).
Therefore, the fourth case calibrates the mean of the initial marriage draw (µs) to
the 1960s marriage and divorce rate. The initial marriage draw has to be raised
since men receive a lower utility from marrying low wage women (see Chapter 2).
As women have relative lower wages in the 1960s men are less likely to marry in the
current model specification. Consequently, increasing the mean of the initial draw
results in a greater number of successful meetings.
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Table 3.3: Results
Savings Marriage Rate Divorce Rate
(1): 1.19 54.91 23.44
(2): 1.12 84.23 19.51
(3): 1.13 50.75 11.91
(4): 1.41 75.87 10.65
Table 3.3 highlights the importance of marriage and divorce on aggregate
savings. As reference the actual savings rate, computed Cubeddu and Ŕıos-Rull
(1997), is 36 percent higher in the 1960s. Case (1) and (2) do poorly in matching
marriage and divorce rates. The rise in aggregate savings is primarily due to in-
creased savings of single females (on average 28 percent), and with a lesser extend
by married households (14 percent). In contrast, the introduction of tighter divorce
laws, Scenario (2), leads to an increase in the marriage rate, with divorce rates re-
maining almost at the 1980s level. Agents feel a lower thread to being divorced and
are willing to marry with a lower match quality. The aggregate savings rate rises
primarily due to married couples’ behavior. While married couples save on average
27 percent more, singles save roughly 15 percent more.
Combining points (1) and (2) virtually matches the divorce rate in the 1960s.
However, Scenario (3) underestimates the actual marriage rate. As explained above,
this is due to the simplified version of the model. In this case, as women earn lower
wages, men obtain a lower utility from marriage, ergo men are less likely to marry
in the 1960s, ceteris paribus. Now increased savings are mainly driven by single
women due to their lower wages, as well as the incentive structure of the marriage
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market that rewards savings with attracting a “better” husband. While women save
on average 30 percent, married households save 13 percent and single male 5 percent
more then in the 1980s.
Scenario (4) adjust for the decreased utility from marriage in the 1960s,
by postulating that the initial mean marriage draw was higher in the 1960s. This
implies that marriage has a benefit beyond combined wage income and economies
of scale. We can think of this benefit as increased home production or fertility. The
mean match quality is raised from µs = −5.65 to µs = −4.05. This calibrated version
matches the actual fall in the aggregate savings rate remarkably well. Married
couples and single females in the model save about 60 percent more in the 1960s then
in the 1980s compared to 83 and 71 percent in the data (see Table 3.1), respectively.
While single male in the model save roughly 40 percent more in the 1960s then in
the 1980s compared to 130 percent in the data. This increase is due to lower female
wages, lower divorce risk, as well as the incentive structure of the marriage market
driving single agents to save more.
The exogenous version of the model fails in all aspects. The model predicts
a 28 percent higher savings rate in the 1960s. In this case single females save the
greatest fraction of their income (54 percent), while married couples save about the
same as males (35 percent). When keeping wages constant across the time periods,
aggregates savings rise by about 14 percent, with all types of households saving
roughly 27 to 30 percent more. In contrast, Scenario (4) does well in matching
the fall in married and single women’s savings rate. However, Scenario (4) cannot
account for the tremendous fall in single males savings rate from 1960 to 1980.
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To summarize, marriage incentive and divorce risk have a sizable effect on
aggregate savings and are more pronounced in the endogenous version, resulting
from the different incentives to save in the two models. In the exogenous version,
there is no incentive for single agents to save in order to attract a spouse. Moreover,
in the endogenous version, married couples that have a better chance of remaining
married save more, while in the exogenous version all couples face the same divorce
probability. Ergo, if divorce risk is low, married agents increase savings almost
twofold in the endogenous version. It should be noted that the increasing savings
rate across match quality is concave, rather than monotonically increasing. More
specifically, households with extremely high match quality save slightly less then a
couple with an average match quality does, since savings function as an incentive
to discourage divorce.
3.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to assess the importance of marriage uncer-
tainty when explaining household savings behavior. The results suggest marriage
uncertainty to be a non-negligible factor in determining savings decisions within a
household. Increased savings arise due to three reasons, (1) assortive matching in
the marriage market leads singles to save more and attract better spouses, (2) mar-
riage allows agents to increase savings and consumption levels due to economies of
scale in consumption, and (3) savings incentives decrease considerable with increased
divorce risk.
The results presented highlight the differences between the endogenous and
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exogenous model. Although the exogenous model allows economist to estimate more
complex models due to less computational complexity, the resulting conclusions can
potentially be misleading, e.g. the effect on aggregate savings is considerable greater
in the endogenous version. Moreover, the reason for the fall in savings rate differ
greatly between the two versions.
The above model has some shortcomings that to be analyzed in future re-
search. As can be seen in Scenario (4) of the computational exercise the benefits
from marriage in the 1960s cannot be solely explained by wages and economies of
scale. This follows from omitting all decision on labor market participation, home
production, and fertility. It should not be surprising that labor market choices differ
considerably between married and single people. A great portion of women, espe-
cially in the past, worked primarily as housewives. In the early 1960s about 50
percent of married women were out of the labor force, but only 25 percent were so








I estimate brain and brawn requirements for United States census occupa-
tion and industry classifications from the 1977 Dictionary of Occupational Title
(DOT).1 This DOT survey set is particularly useful since, (1) it is readily available
in an electronic format, (2) it has been merged with the 1971 Current Population
Survey (CPS) allowing for civilian employment population weighted results, and (3)
it lies mid-way through the period under study (the late 1970s). To estimate brain
and brawn levels over time and gender I use factor analysis as in Ingram and Neu-
mann (2006). Factor analysis is a technique to reduce a large number of variables,
called characteristics, within a dataset to a few unobserved random variables, called
factors. The 1977 DOT reports 38 job characteristics for over 12,000 occupations
(see Section 1.2 for detail on these characteristics). These characteristics capture
the heterogeneity across jobs and workers. While they measure different specific
job requirements, they can be grouped into broader categories of skills in terms
of their common underlying dimensions. This grouping reduces the dimensionality
of heterogeneity allowing factor requirements to be matched in a simple general
1Data, including documentation, is available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR).
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equilibrium model.
Factor analysis uses the correlation matrix of a set of dependent variables
to uncover the functional form of some undefined independent variables. In the
general specification the characteristics, Ci, are modeled as linear combinations of
the independent variables or factors, fi, plus an error term εi,
Ci = µ+ ΛFi + εi for i=1,. . . , N, (A.1)
where N equals the number of occupations; Ci is the vector of characteristics (38×1);
µ is the vector of characteristic means (38×1); Λ is a vector of coefficients (38×nf )
called factor loadings; Fi = (f1, f2, · · · , fnf )′ is a vector of the factors (nf × 1); and
εi ∼ N(0,Σ) is the uncorrelated error vector, with Σ being the diagonal variance
covariance matrix.
To preform factor analysis certain variables of the DOT need to be rescaled,
for example, the variable documenting a job’s location is coded I=indoors, O=outdoors,
and B=both indoors and outdoors. I follow Vijverberg and Hartog (2005) in rescal-
ing all variables. Additionally, to obtain population representative estimates, the
occupations in the DOT must be weighted. As the DOT itself does not record
the number of workers for a given job, the 1971 CPS merge is used. In the 1977
DOT, the Committee on Occupational Classification and Analysis of the National
Academy of Sciences funded by the Department of Labor and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission merged the 12,431 1977 DOT jobs to 7,289 unique
occupation-industry pairs from the 1970 United States Census providing 1971 CPS
weights of the civilian labor force. The reduction from 12,431 to 7,289 is the result
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of more detailed occupational classifications in the DOT. For example, while there
is only one “waiter/waitress” category in the census classification, the DOT con-
tains multiple categories, such as “waiter/waitress formal”, “waiter/waitress, head”,
“waiter/waitress, take out.”
Since only information on the characteristics is available, this information is











Λ′ + Σ, (A.2)
that is, the covariance in the 38 characteristics can be explained by a reduced num-





, and Σ are not separately identifiable from this expression. Therefore,
factor analysis generally assumes factors to follow a standardized normal distribu-




additional restrictions must be imposed. In standard factor analysis the covariance
between factors is set to zero,
E(F̂ F̂ ′) =

1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0
. . .
0 · · · 1
 , (A.3)
allowing both Λ and Σ, which is diagonal by assumption, to be identified separately.
In this specification each characteristic is a function of all factors. In practice,
the first factor estimate will explain the maximum possible covariance between the
characteristics. The second factor is estimated to explain the maximum covariance
remaining, and so on. A maximum of 38 factors could be estimated, in which case
38 factors are necessary to explain the covariance between all characteristics. In this
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study three factors explain most of the characteristics’ covariance structure (over 93
percent of the total covariance).2 After preforming initial factor analysis as described
above, the first factor is positively related to intellectual characteristics and nega-
tively correlated with both motor coordination and physical characteristics, making
it difficult to interpret the factor consistently. Therefore, I reestimate the factors
assuming they are correlated, similarly to Ingram and Neumann (2006). However,
for identification purposes, job characteristics that explain one factor are restricted
and cannot explain another factor. For example, mathematical development only
explains a job’s intellectual requirements directly, while it is only informative on the
job’s physical requirements through the correlation of the aggregate brain and brawn
factor. Table A.1 provides the classification of characteristics across factors as well
as the factor loading coefficients, which are used to determine factor estimates for
each occupation-industry combination present in the 1971 CPS. Given the grouping
of characteristics and the estimates of factor loadings, I call the three factors brain,
motor coordination, and brawn. Brain, brawn, and motor coordination trends over
time (see Figure 1.4) are robust to either the standard identification restriction of
uncorrelated factors or my reestimated identification of correlated factors.
2Ingram and Neumann use the 1991 DOT with over 53 characteristics, primarily expanded
by detailing physical and environmental characteristics, to estimate a total of four factors: (1)
intelligence, (2) clerical skill, (3) gross motor skill, and (4) ability to deal with physically and
hazardous work.
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Table A.1: Factor Loading Estimates (Λ)

















Talking and Hearing 0.57950




Making Evaluations Based on Judgment 0.60055
Making Judgments/Decisions 0.43480










Attaining Precise Tolerances 0.72865
Reaching/Handling/Fingering/Feeling 0.50627
Making Decisions Based on Measurable Criteria 0.30894
Notes: Estimated using maximum-likelihood factor analysis.
aEnvironmental conditions, such as the presence of heat, cold, and humidity,
were combined to one variable prior to the estimation.
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A.2 Regression Estimates











Notes: ∗ Statistically significant at the 1 percent confidence level. Standard errors are in
parenthesis. The regression also includes controls for age, age squared, years of education, marital
status, race, region, motor coordination factor, and a T-year dummy.





Brain to Brawn Labor -0.3967528∗
(0.0593553)
R-squared 0.739






This appendix provides some of the derivations of the equations in section



































< 0. Given condition (2.13)
this is satisfied for any parameter values. The partial derivate for the secondary























which is greater than zero as by definition (1− γc)σα is non-negative.
The inequality from (2.29) follows from the assumption that the primary
wage earner has a higher wage than the secondary wage earner, i.e.
b1,k > b1,k (B.3)
⇒ Um,e − Uk > Uf,e − Uk (B.4)
⇒ Um,e > Uf,e (B.5)
⇔ ωm,e > ωf,k. (B.6)
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Cubbedu, L. and Ŕıos-Rull, J.-V. (2002). Families as Shocks. Technical Report 1,
Centro de Altisimos Estudios Rios Perez (CAERP).
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Dı́az-Gimnez, J., Quadrini, V., and Ŕıos-Rull, J.-V. (1997). Dimensions of Inequal-
ity: Facts on the U.S. Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth. Quarterly
Review, (Spr):3–21.
Fernández, R. (2007). Culture as Learning: The Evolution of Female Labor Force
Participation over a Century. NBER Working Papers 13373, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc.
Finke, M. S. and Pierce, N. L. (2006). Precautionary Savings Behavior of Maritally
Stressed Couples. Family and Consumer Sciences Research Journal, 34(3):223–
240.
116
Fogli, A. and Veldkamp, L. (2007). Nature or Nurture? Learning and Female Labour
Force Dynamics. CEPR Discussion Papers 6324, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Friedberg, L. (1998). Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from
Panel Data. The American Economic Review, 88(3):608–627.
Galor, O. and Weil, D. N. (1996). The Gender Gap, Fertility, and Growth. American
Economic Review, 86(3):374–87.
Goldin, C., Katz, L. F., and Kuziemko, I. (2006). The Homecoming of American
College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap. NBER Working Papers
12139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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